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The widely-publicized trial of China's legendary "Gang of Four"
and six other fallen political and military leaders in November and De-
cember of 1980 gave the foreign press wide opportunity to comment on
the operation of China's new codes of criminal law and procedure. Al-
though the politically charged nature of the case probably made it an
unsuitable one for use as an example by which to appraise the new sys-
tem, the Chinese themselves seemed anxious for the trial to be seen by
both domestic and foreign observers as a strictly legal proceeding. With
increasing frequency as the case progressed, China's top legal scholars
provided explanations of various aspects of China's criminal justice sys-
tem as they were used in the Gang's trial.' Many of these commentaries
seemed to be directed squarely at foreign criticisms of the handling of
the Gang of Four case.
* The romanization system for Chinese names and words used throughout the text and
notes is the piinin system of the People's Republic of China. Where sources cited use other
systems, the pinyin is given in parentheses. Quotations from and titles of Chinese materials
are, except where otherwise noted, in the author's translation, which is not necessarily the
same as translations of such titles and materials cited in the notes.
** Associate, Baker & McKenzie, Hong Kong; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1981, Member
East Asian Legal Studies Program; A.B. University of Pennsylvania, 1977.
1 See Famous Legal &holar Zhang Youyu Answers Reporter! Qwstions, Renmin Ribao (People's
Daily), Nov. 22, 1980, at 1; Interview with (urist) qu Shaoheng, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, Daily Report: People's Republic of China [hereinafter cited as FBIS-CHI], Jan. 29,
1981, at L2; (Vice-Director and &crea,7 of the Legal Committee of the National Peo le'r Congress
Sanding Committee) Wang Hanwu Answers the Questions of Xinhua Repiorter, Renmin Ribao, Dec.
12, 1980, at 4; Zhang Zipei & Tao Mao, SeveralProcedural Questions Concerning the Tal of the Lin
Biao andJiang qng Counterrevolutionary Cliques, Renmin Ribao, Feb. 2, 1981, at 5, trans in FBIS-
CHI, Feb. 10, 1981, at L10; Chen Guangzhong & He Bingsong, The Qwstion of Evidence in the
Th7al of the Lin Biao andJiang Qing Counterrevolutionagy Cliques, Renmin Ribao, Feb. 3, 1981, at 5,
trans. in FBIS-CHI, Feb. 11, 1981, at L23; Ma Rongjie, An Example of Tging Cases in Accordance
with the Law, Renmin Ribao, Jan. 27, 1981, at 5, trans. in FBIS-CHI, Jan. 28, 1981, at LI;
Huang Lin & Hu Heng, Take Facts as the Basis and Law as the Critenrion--Interviewing Woman
Jurist Han Youtong, Guangming Ribao (Enlightenment Daily), Dec. 21, 1980, at 3; trans. in
FBIS-CHI, Jan. 8, 1981, at L16.
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A common criticism was that the trial of the radical leaders demon-
strated how, in China, criminal defendants are "presumed guilty until
found guilty." 2 For a start, over a year before the Gang went on trial,
then Party Chairman Hua Guofeng had assured a foreign correspon-
dent that, despite their "very grave crimes," Jiang Qng and the others
would not be sentenced to death3-a predetermination of guilt lurking
behind what Hua obviously thought was a humanitarian remark.4 In
the weeks preceding and during the trial China's official press regularly
referred to Jiang Qing and her colleagues as "counterrevolutionaries," a
term which by the Chinese own standards in their new emphasis on
legal precision and the removal of arbitrary political labels, should only
be used to describe those guilty of the specific conduct encompassed by
the crime of counterrevolution in the Criminal Law ("Chinese CL").5
The front pages of the newspapers, furthermore, featured cartoons of the
defendants in a coffin about to be nailed shut,6 and in "the garbage
heap of history." 7 Clearly, there was no "presumption of innocence" at
work here.
The Chinese could, of course, have answered foreign critics by not-
ing that the Gang of Four case was an exceptional one. Instead, the
legal experts commenting on the case took it upon themselves to explain
that the Chinese approach to criminal procedure is not to engage either
in the "presumption of guilt"-the "feudal" method they accused the
Gang of Four of employing during its lawless reign--or in the "pre-
sumption of innocence." Instead, the concept of "taking facts as the
basis and the law as the yardstick," enunciated in the new Criminal
Procedure Law ("Chinese CP")9 the stress on thorough investigation
and reliable evidence, the strict prohibition on extracting confessions by
2 Butterfield, In China, Thq're Presumed Guilty Until Found Guilty, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23,
1980, at D4, col. 3.
3 FBIS-CHI, Oct. 9, 1979, at L4.
4 The comments of Party Chairman Hua also raised interesting questions about judicial
independence from the Communist Party.
5 THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 90 [hereinafter cited
as CHINESE CL] (passed at the Second Meeting of the Fifth Session of the National People's
Congress, July 1, 1979), COMPENDIUM OF PUBLIC SECURITY LAWS AND REGULATIONS 1950-
1979 4 (1980) [hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM]). The English translation of the CHINESE
CL is printed at pp. 138-70 supra.
' 
See CRIMINAL RESEARCH GROUP,' THE LAW INSTITUTE,
THE CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES LECTURES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW, trans. in 13
CHINA L. & GOV'T 1, 42-44 (1980).
6 Renmin Ribao, Nov. 22, 1980, at 1.
7 Id., Nov. 24, 1980, at 1.
8 See, e.g., Chen Guangzhong & He Bingsong, note 1 supra.
9 THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 4 [here-
inafter cited as CHINESE CP] (passed at the Second Meeting of the Fifth Session of the Na-
tional People's Congress, July 1, 1979), COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at 35. The English
translation of the CHINESE CP is printed at pp. 171-203 supra.
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force,10 and related principles of China's new legal order, are employed
to achieve the accurate and fair administration of justice. The Chinese
legal system, we were told, does not "presume" anything-it "seeks
truth from facts."' 1
Those statements about the presumption of innocence, of course,
raise many questions in the minds of Westerners accustomed to thinking
of the presumption as an undeniable principle of criminal procedure. In
appearing to reject categorically the concept for China's criminal proce-
dure, and to replace it with an appealing but by itself unrevealing slo-
gan, the Chinese may have done more to heighten the suspicion of
foreign observers than satisfactorily to respond to their criticisms.
In fact, though the view expressed by the jurists quoted at the time
of the Gang of Four case is reflected to a significant extent in China's
contemporary legal literature, it is by no means universally shared. The
revival of the legal profession and legal education beginning in the late
1970s 2 has been accompanied by the publication of a number of law
journals, legal books and commentaries. In light of the promulgation in
July 1979 of the codes of criminal law and procedure, such questions
have been among the most discussed topics in this new literature. The
presumption of innocence has been receiving particularly close atten-
tion, with China's major law review featuring at least one article on the
subject in almost every issue of 1980. As will be seen, the views ex-
pressed in these recent discussions range from the outright rejection of
the presumption in favor of the "truth from facts" rubric, describing the
presumption as contradictory to that approach, to its wholehearted en-
dorsement as a useful principle for China's criminal procedure, consis-
tent with and supplementing other basic principles.13
Discussions of the presumption of innocence had been carried out
in the mid-1950s at a time when a criminal procedure code was in the
drafting stage. The "anti-rightist" movement that began in 1957 ren-
dered difficult the serious legal analysis of this and other criminal law
issues, forcing the discussions to serve the political dictates of the day.
The draft procedure code that had been prepared by 1957 was
shelved.' 4 Although there was some revival of legal discussion and
10 CHINESE CP, art. 32.
11 See, e.g., Famous Legal Scholar Zhang Youyu, note 1 Mspra; Zhang Zipei & Tao Mao,
note 1 .rufra.
12 See Gelatt & Snyder, Legal Education in Chi=" Trainingfor a New Era, 1 CHINESE L. REP.
41(1980).
13 See detailed discussion in sections V & VII inJfa. For summaries of the various view-
points, see Several Questions Being Dthated in Fora of Legal Studies, 1 MINZHU Yu FAZHI (DEMOC-
RACY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM) 60, 61-62 (1979); Some Trends in Current Domestic Legal Studies,
Renmin Ribao, Jan. 27, 1981, at 5, tram. in BEIJING REv., Apr. 6, 1981, at 16.
14 Set S. LENG, JUSTICE IN COMMUNIST CHINA 54, 147 (1967).
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drafting work in the early 1960s, t5 the political movements preceding
the Cultural Revolution, and then the Cultural Revolution itself, soon
preempted these efforts. The published discussions on the presumption
of innocence resumed, naturally enough, in the late 1970s as the old
draft code was being reconsidered and put into final form.
The fact that the Chinese CP passed in 1979 did not mention the
presumption of innocence among its opening general principles is not of
key significance to the question of whether the concept is accepted-or
might be accepted-in China's criminal procedure. Codes of criminal
procedure in the civilian countries whose basic scheme the Chinese CP
adopts do not generally spell out the principle, leaving it to be men-
tioned in the constitution or other general legislation, 16 or not at all.
The relevant legislation of the Soviet Union makes no explicit reference
to the presumption. 17 The presumption of innocence, nonetheless, may
generally be said to be accepted as a principle of criminal procedure in
the aforementioned systems.18
This article will trace the themes in the recent debates and the dis-
cussions of the 1950s with a view to indicating how different Chinese
jurists have understood the concept of the presumption of innocence and
how their understanding of the term has affected their perception of its
position in the Chinese system. A comparative analysis of relevant pro-
visions of the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law will be. undertaken to
point out the ways in which that code might be viewed as consistent or
inconsistent with a presumption of innocence. Various aspects of the
criminal process in the People's Republic that bear upon the application
of the presumption of innocence, such as the questions of the right to
defense and the right to remain silent will be examined. Since the trial
stage with which Anglo-American jurisprudence generally associates the
15 Id. at 72-74; Legal Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Pay Close
Attention to Formulating a Criminal Law and A Criminalftocedure Law, Guangming Ribao, Nov. 2,
1978, at 2.
16 The preamble to the French Constitution of 1958 incorporates by reference the 1789
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, article 9 of which reads: "Everyone being
presumed innocent until he has been declared guilty, if it is judged absolutely necessary to
arrest a person, any severity that was not absolutely necessary to secure his person must be
severely suppressed by the law." A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAw SYSTEM
229 (1977). The German Ratifying Law of Aug. 7, 1952, gives domestic law status to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention on Human Rights), art. 6(2) of which reads: "Everyone charged with a criminal
offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law." Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6(2), 213
U.N.T.S. 228; Ratifying Law of Aug. 7, 1952, (1952) Bundesgesetzblatt II 685, 953.
17 The criminal procedure codes of some of the East European satellite states do make
such explicit references. Berman & Quigley, Comment on the Presurmption of Innocen e Under Soviet
Law, 15 U.C.L.A. L REV. 1230, 1232 (1968).
18 See discussion in section VI inra.
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presumption of innocence may not be the most relevant one in the conti-
nental-Soviet-Chinese pattern, it will be important throughout to con-
sider at what stage or stages of the Chinese criminal process the
presumption should be applied.
The purpose of the author is not to reach a simple conclusion as to
whether or not the People's Republic of China "has" the presumption of
innocence. Any such conclusion would, as will become evident, be pre-
mature and unhelpful. The author's interest lies in going beyond the
quick assertions of casual observers of China's legal development to see,
through an examination of one particularly difficult and important is-
sue, some of the difficulties and tensions the Chinese have been facing in
developing a theory and system of criminal procedure that meets their
practical, sociological, and ideological needs.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
As a preliminary matter, some brief background will be sketched of
imperial China's criminal procedure and of criminal procedure develop-
ments in the first half of this century as these bear upon our focus of
concern.
A. IMPERIAL CHINA
Contemporary Chinese jurists commonly refer to the judicial sys-
tem of the "feudal" period of China's history' 9 as being characterized by
the "presumption of guilt."'20 They note the all-importance in that sys-
tem of the accused's confession, which torture could be employed to ob-
tain.21 Also emphasized is the fact that the Code of the Tang Dynasty 22
allowed a person whose guilt could not be confirmed by the evidence to
be sentenced nonetheless, though allowed to "redeem" his sentence in
money or property if he could afford to do so. 23
Interestingly, an early statement on criminal procedure, in the Luix-
ing chapter of the ancient Book of Historical Documents, 24 describes the
proper conduct of cases in a way that might, if followed, have led to the
installing of a presumption of innocence or in dubio pro reo concept into
the Chinese legal tradition. "In doubtful cases," the passage explains,
19 In Chinese Communist periodization, this period is from 475 B.C. to A.D. 1840.
20 See, e.g., Zhang Zipei, Anafy.* of the Iinc ie of the "Peution of lmocence," 3 FAXUE
YANJIU (LEGAL RESEARCH) 30, 30 (1980).
21 See text accompanying note 34 infia.
22 A.D. 619-906.
23 Tanglu Shuyi (Tang Code), ch. 30, para. 17, quated in Zhang Zipei, sufra note 20, at 30.
24 The date of this compilation has never been firmly established, though it is believed by
some scholars to have been compiled by Confucius, who died in 478 B.C. SeeJ. LEGGE, THE
CHINESE CLASSICS: VOLUME III, THE SHOO KING 1-15 (1970 ed.).
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the court must "investigate... ascertain and verify... minutely." If
guilt is not "ascertained" the court "should not. . .deal with" the case.25
Little information is available to determine the extent to which this
comment was reflected in practice between the time it was written and
the twelfth or thirteenth century A.D. The Tang provision of the sev-
enth century noted earlier would in any event appear inconsistent with
the spirit of the Liixing passage.
Our knowledge of first instance judicial procedure in the Song,
Ming, and Qing dynasties26 indicates that in those periods there was
little if any adherence to a notion of giving the accused the benefit of the
doubt, and tends to bear out the Chinese Communist analysis of the
system. Cases in the first instance were both investigated, prosecuted,
and tried by a county magistrate who in addition to his law-keeping and
judicial functions was the local administrative chief.27 His manner of
handling cases was inquisitorial, in the most common-and negative-
sense of that term.28 The underlying premise seemed to be that anyone
who became involved with the law by being accused of a crime was
guilty-if not necessarily of the crime he was accused of, in any case of
being a "party to a disturbance of the peace in the district," 29 which it
was the overriding purpose of the magistrate to maintain.
The magistrates, not having the time or resources for a thorough
evidentiary inquiry, and believing in any event in the supreme value of
the accused's confession, relied heavily if not exclusively30 on the ques-
tioning of the accused. The form of the interrogations, both before and
during the formal trial, made it appear that the defendant was assumed
guilty as long as he could not prove his innocence. 3' At trial the ac-
cused-referred to as a "prisoner" even before the case had been
heard32-knelt before the bench, and constables were on hand with
bamboo poles and whips that could be and were used to urge on the
25 Translation of B. Karlgren, in R. VAN GULIK, T'ANG-YIN-PI-SHIH: PARALLEL CASES
FROM UNDER THE PEAR TREE 49 (1956).
26 A.D. 960-1279, A.D. 1368-1644, A.D. 1644-1911, respectively.
27 See T. CH'U, LOCAL GOVERNME.NT IN CHINA UNDER THE CH'ING 116-29 (1962);
Miyazaki, The Administration ofJustice During the Sung (Song) Dynasty, in ESSAYS ON CHINA'S
LEGAL TRADITION 56, 59-62 (J. Cohen, R. Edwards & F. Chen eds. 1980); see geally J.
WATT, THE DIsTRIar MAGISTRATE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA (1972).
28 The term "inquisitorial" is also used as a term of al to describe continental criminal
procedure systems.
29 R. VAN GULIK, supra note 25, at 56.
30 See S. VAN DER SPRENKEL, LEGAL INSTrrrIONs IN MANCHU CHINA 74 (1966);
Miyazaki, supra note 27, at 61.
31 See S. VAN DER SPRENKEL, rfra note 30, at 68; R. VAN GULIK, supra note 25, at 56.
32 R. VAN GULIK, supra note 25, at 56. The Chinese term was qiu.
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defendant reluctant to confess.33 Though magistrates differed in their
views on the use of torture, many saw it as a useful way to secure the
confession that was the sine qua non of conviction in the traditional Chi-
nese legal system.34 Defense counsel did not figure in the criminal
process.
Concurrent with this approach to the basic level trial was the no-
tion running through the legal codes and commentaries of the imperial
era that the natural order would be disturbed by the punishment of an
innocent person.3 5 This idea may to some degree have tempered the
presumption of guilt in the tribunals of the imperial magistrates. In the
main, however, the magistrate's approach seemed to have been to pre-
sume guilt from the mere fact that the accused was before him. If the
defendant managed to prove to the magistrate's satisfaction during the
course of the interrogations that he was innocent and had been falsely
accused, one way to maintain the proper order of society was to punish
the accuser for the crime of false accusation.3 6 In addition, an elaborate
review procedure existed for all but the most minor cases37 and no doubt
rectified to some extent errors made as a result of the lower level pre-
sumption of guilt, though it could obviously not make whole the accused
who had suffered the effects of that presumption. A complex scheme of
punishments for magistrates who in light of review were found to have
rendered wrong judgments may have tempered the guilt-presuming atti-
tude of these officials in handling cases, though in this regard it should
be noted that penalties were prescribed for mistaken acquittals or overly
light sentences as well as for wrong convictions or excessive sentences.38
B. LATE IMPERIAL AND REPUBLICAN PERIODS
The first decade of this century, which was also the final decade of
the Qing or Manchu dynasty, saw the emergence of a group of law re-
formers, many of whom had become steeped, through study in Japan, in
the contemporary Western doctrines of criminal law and procedure that
stemmed from Enlightenment philosophers such as Voltaire, Rousseau,
33 See S. VAN DER SPRENKEL, supra note 30, at, 74; R. VAN GU:IK, "upra note 25, at 56;
Miyazaki, supra note 27, at 61.
34 See T. CH'U, sufra note 27, at 125; R. VAN GULIK, supra note 25, at 56; Miyazaki, supra
note 27, at 61.
35 See I.W. JOHNSON, THE TANG CODE 15 (1979).
36 In some cases the punishment for this crime was determined by reference to the crime
the defendant had falsely accused someone of. See D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPE-
RIAL CHINA 402-08 (1967). This principle is still reflected in Chinese criminal law today. See
CHINESE CL, art. 138.
37 See D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 36, at 113-43.
38 T. CH'U, supra note 27, at 128-29. Penalties for magistrates were generally lighter for
overly light than for overly heavy sentences. Id.
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and Beccaria. Among those doctrines, which emerged out of a felt need
to reform an inquisitorial system on the continent that in many respects
rivaled the Chinese system for cruelty,39 was the presumption of inno-
cence, which saw its first formal enunciation in the French Declaration
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789. 40 The draft criminal
procedure law that the late Qing law reformers presented to the impe-
rial throne in 1906 was informed by the basic proposition that a suspect
was to be presumed innocent unless proven otherwise, and included the
abolition of ill-treatment of defendants and the imposition of fixed limits
on pretrial detention.41 Though that draft law aroused tremendous con-
servative opposition and was never approved, 42 the later drafts prepared
during the first twenty years of the Republic founded in 1911 and the
Criminal Procedure Code ultimately adopted in 193543 were based on
the same continental principles as the late Qing efforts, absorbed
through Japan," and reflect the notion of the presumption of
innocence. 45
C. THE EARLY CHINESE COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE: 1927-4946
At the same time as the Republican legal structure was taking
shape in those parts of China controlled by the Nationalists, the Chinese
Communists were beginning to develop a legal system of their own. The
early years of the Chinese "soviets" in the South China countryside, be-
ginning in 1927, resembled the era of "war communism" after the 1917
Russian Revolution. Peasant tribunals engaged in rapid "trials" of gen-
try and landlords followed by immediate execution. In the course of
their investigatory and judicial activities, these tribunals commonly en-
gaged in the torture-induced confessions that had characterized the old
imperial order. Even after the establishment of a system of "people's
courts" in 1931, with some division of police, prosecutorial and judicial
39 Ste generaly A. ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 55-390
(1913); Stepan, Possible Lersons From Continental Criminal Procedure, in THE EcONOMIcs OF
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 181, 182-86 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1973).
40 See note 16 supira.
41 J. Cheng, Chinese Law in Transition: The Late Ch'ing Law Reform, 1901-1911 157-59
(1976) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Brown University).
42 Id at 154-55.
43 See L. Fuller & H. Fisher, THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
CHINA iv-xxii (1960). The 1935 code, as amended in 1967, remains in effect on Taiwan. See
note 167 infra.
44 See Fa, A Comparative Study ofJudical Review Under Nationalist Chinese andAm ecan Constitu-
tional Law, Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies 31-39 (No. 4,
1980); Takayanagi, A Centuo' of Inrovation: The Development ofjfapanese Law, 1868-1961, in LAW
IN JAPAN 5, 18-23 (A. Von Mehren ed. 1963).
45 See section VI in/ra for some discussion of relevant aspects of the Republic of China
Code.
46 The discussion in section II(c) relies heavily on S. Eio, supra note 14, at 1-26.
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functions, legal procedures introduced to curb the earlier excesses were
not always observed, often falling victim to the political exigencies of
suppressing "counterrevolution" from within the Party and external
resistance. The right to defense provided in judicial regulations, for in-
stance, apparently existed primarily on paper.47
In the Yenan period, 1935-45, when the Communists concentrated
their power in northwestern base areas, a wartime "united front" with
the Nationalists relieved some of the political tensions and allowed more
attention to be paid to police and judicial restraint, emphasis on evi-
dence more than confessions, the prohibition of torture, and related is-
sues. The concern with the punishment of war criminals and class
enemies in the post-1945 period of civil war, in turn, led to a reversion to
more of a "presumption of guilt" model. "Struggle sessions" were fol-
lowed in some cases by on-the-spot executions.48
D. THE EARLY PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC: 1949-53
Although steps were taken in the early years of the People's Repub-
lic to formulate rules and regulations for the administration of justice,
the war communism aura was predominant in the work of the special
people's tribunals set up as part of campaigns to wage attacks on corrup-
tion and counterrevolution and to enforce the land reform movement. 49
The massive number of cases handled made procedural cautions im-
practical.50 Although the regulations for the people's tribunals stipu-
lated a right of defense, the political atmosphere of the day militated
against any attempt to use that right.51 The guilt of the accused in these
proceedings "was for all practical purposes a foregone conclusion. '52
During the period of "judicial reform" beginning in 1952, 53 the
people's courts, purged of most Nationalist personnel, began to supplant
the informal tribunals in the administration of justice. For the first year
of this reform movement, the emphasis was on rejecting "old," "bour-
geois" law concepts and "legal technicalities,"5 4 a category in which the
presumption of innocence may be assumed to have been included.5 5 A
47 Id. at 128.
48 Id. at 21.
49 See J. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-
1963 9-10 (1968); H. WEI, COURTS AND POLICE IN COMMUNIST CHINA TO 1952 17-40
(1955).
50 H. WEI, supra note 49, at 12.
51 See S. LENG, supra note 14, at 38; H. WEI, supra note 49, at 6-7.
52 S. LENG, sura note 14, at 38.
53 See J. COHEN, supra note 49, at 9-10; S. LENG, supra note 14, at 39-44.
54 S. LENG, sufpra note 14, at 42; ste Tao Xijin, On theJudidal Reform, 5 ZHENGFA YANJIU
(PoLITiCAL-LEGAL RESEARCH) 12 (1957).
55 See section IV infra.
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European missionary described his interrogation before a tribunal in the
prison where he was being held in 1953: "The judge said to me: 'If you
have been arrested, it is not without reason. . . . It is. . .certain that
you are guilty.'" To protest one's innocence was to "defy the
government." 56
The "constitutional" era that began in 1954 with the promulgation
of a constitution, 57 as well as organic laws for courts and procuracies,
58
was a period in which initial efforts were made to establish a criminal
process characterized by separated police, procuratorial, and judicial
functions, the right to defense,59 appeal,60 and other guarantees. It is no
doubt accurate to conclude that in most cases innocence "was not seri-
ously at issue" at the public trials that were beginning to take place in
the mid-1950s.6' Nonetheless, the attempts to provide an investigatory
process that showed concern for evidence and not just the extraction of
confessions, mechanisms to control arbitrary arrest and detention,62 and
a system of defense counsel who could and did argue for mitigation of
responsibility and punishment, were significant. It was during this pe-
riod, lasting through the early part of 1957, that the atmosphere had
cleared sufficiently from the days of "judicial reform" to allow for seri-
ous intellectual discussions in China's legal literature of "old" legal theo-
ries-among them, the presumption of innocence and related issues.
56 J. COHEN, sufpra note 49, at 368, 371.
57 CONST. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (passed at the First Meeting of the First
Session of the National People's Congress Sept. 20, 1954, promulgated by the Presidium,
Sept. 20, 1954), 1 FAGUI HUIBIAN (COMPENDIUM OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS) 4 (Sept.
1954-June 1955) [hereinafter cited as FGHB]), trans. in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS
OF COMMUNIST CHINA I (A. Blaustein ed. 1962). Page references to the 1954 Constitution in
notes infra are to the translation cited.
58 LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE'S
CTs. [hereinafter "COURT LAW" in text and notes] (passed at the First Meeting of the First
Session of the National People's Congress, Sept. 21, 1954, promulgated by the Chairman of
the People's Republic of China, Sept. 28, 1954), 1 FGHB 123 (Sept. 1954-June 1955) trans. in
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 57, at 131 (page references to the COURT
LAW in notes infra are to the translation cited); LAw OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE'S PROCURACIES (passed at the First Meeting of the First
Session of the National People's Congress, Sept. 21, 1954, promulgated by the Chairman of
the People's Republic of China, Sept. 28, 1954), 1 FGHB 133 (Sept. 1954-June 1955), trans. in
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS, sufira note 57, at 144.
59 CONST. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1954), sufira note 57, art. 76, at 27;
COURT LAW, supra note 58, art. 7, at 132.
60 COURT LAW, supra note 58, art. 11, at 134.
61 J. COHEN, supra note 49, at 13.
62 Under the 1954 Arrest and Detention Act, a maximum of three days' detention was
allowed before the procuracy had to approve formal arrest or release the detainee. ARREST
AND DETENTION ACT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (passed at the Third Meeting of
the Standing Committee of the (First Session of the) National People's Congress, Dec. 20,
1954, promulgated by the Chairman of the People's Republic of China, Dec. 20, 1954), art. 7,
1 FGHB 240-41 (Sept. 1954-June 1955), trans. in J. COHEN, supra note 49, at 361.
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III. DISCUSSIONS BY CHINESE JURISTS OF THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE AND RELATED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ISSUES:
1956-5763
The early commentaries on questions of criminal procedure relat-
ing to the position of the defendant were all basically consistent with a
presumption of innocence analysis, though not all of them used the term
itself. Recurring themes of these initial discussions were that those "ac-
cused" or "suspect" must be distinguished from "criminals," and that a
strict delineation should be drawn among the functions of police,
procuracy, and courts.6 The end of the movements against landlords
and other resisters of the new order and the dawning of the socialist era
were seen as necessitating a change in the orientation of the legal system
from one in which the various legal organs cooperated against a com-
mon class enemy to a system in which divisions of function and procedu-
ral guarantees were to be promoted. These guarantees were not seen so
much as ends in themselves but as means of rendering the criminal pro-
cess more accurate and, as a result, more effective in the fight against
crime.
The defendant, one analyst stressed, must be considered a "sub-
ject," not an "object," of criminal procedure.6 5 At the moment the in-
vestigatory authorities had gathered sufficient evidence to accuse him,
he became an "accused," or "defendant. ' 66 From that point on, he was
entitled to enjoy the presumption of innocence. This meant that the
investigators were to adopt an objective attitude, looking both at evi-
dence tending to incriminate the accused and at points in his defense.
The idea of many judicial workers that the concept of the presumption
of innocence was in contradiction to the arrest of suspects and their pros-
ecution for crimes was erroneous according to this commentator. The
presumption was simply a principle created to dispel the preconception
that all accused persons were inevitably criminals and to assure just and
accurate investigations, based on full evidence, from which the guilty
63 The articles cited in the discussion in section III are primarily from the journal Zhengfa
Yanjiu, Political-Legal Research. This journal began publishing in 1954 under the sponsorship
of the Chinese Political Science and Law Association. Writers included both legal scholars
from the Nationalist era who had been integrated into the new establishments of legal
education and research, and newly trained "political-legal workers." In the 1950s Zhengfa
Yanjiu was one of only two major law journals in China; from 1959-66, when it ceased
publication, it was the only one. Generally, as will be brought out in the text infa, its
contents reflected current political thinking and trends. See J. COHEN, supra note 49, at 59.
64 Liu Qinglin, How to Treat the Defendant in Criminal Cases, 3 ZHENGFA YANjIu 47, 48
(1956); Qu Fu, Brief Disssion of the Procedural Position of the Defendant in Criminal Litigation, 3
ZHENGFA YANJIU 22, 22 (1957); Zhuang Huichen, The Problem in Criminal Procedure of the Rela-
tion Between Adjudication and Investigation and Prosecution, 3 ZHENGFA YANjIu 28 (1957).
65 Qu Fu, supra note 64, at 22.
66 See text accompanying notes 154-56, 161-63 infia.
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would not escape and in which the innocent would not be wronged.67
Another commentator did not endorse the "presumption of inno-
cence" in so many words, but agreed that whether or not a defendant
was really a criminal "generally" could not be confirmed until the final
decision at trial based on the evidence there considered. 68 This with-
holding of judgment, however, would not be necessary in the writer's
view if an accused were caught "in the act" of crime 6 9 -in such cases, by
implication, he could be presumed a criminal from the start. With those
qualifications, the author suggested that the attitude to be adopted to-
ward a defendant until the final court decision was analogous to that of
the skipper of a ship at sea sighting another boat but not yet being able
to tell whether it was an enemy ship or a fishing vessel. A premature
decision either way was to be avoided.70
Consistent with this approach was the specification by the com-
mentaries of various rights the defendant should enjoy at the investiga-
tory stage. Most important was the right to defense, though so as not
unduly to hinder the basic objective of criminal procedure, to expose
criminals, only the right to defend oneself existed at this pretrial investi-
gatory stage.71 In addition, the right to call witnesses, to confront a pri-
vate accuser, to know the charges and evidence against oneself, and to
seek redress for illegal conduct of investigatory officials during the pre-
trial activities were cited as appropriate rights at this stage. 72
The analysts at this time stressed that the trial itself must be al-
lowed to play a significant independent role and must not be considered
simply a continuation or cursory review of the preliminary investigation.
Law review articles on criminal procedure contemplated a scheme in
which a thorough investigation would be carried out prior to prosecu-
tion, and a preliminary review of the case by a judge would be under-
taken prior to the actual trial before a collegial bench. 73 Although, as
one of the commentators pointed out, the prosecutor, in order to prose-
cute the defendant, and the judge, in order to send the case for full trial,
must be "positive and unwavering," without any doubt, of the defend-
67 Qu Fu, supra note 64, at 23, 26. A similar analysis is found in Huang Dao, Br'ef Dicis-
sion ofthe Prindple in Crinunal Procedure ofthe Presumption ofInnocence, 2 FAXUE (LEGAL SCIENCE)
49 (1957).
68 Liu Qinglin, supra note 64, at 51.
69 Id. at 49.
70 Id. at 51.
71 Qu Fu, supra note 64, at 24. See also Zhou Hengyuan, On the Defendant's Right of Defense
in Our County's Criminal Procedure, 3 ZHENGFA YANjIU 51, 53 (1956).
72 Zhou Hengyuan, supra note 71, at 53.
73 This was presumably the structure set out in the draft criminal procedure codes being
prepared at that time and implemented on a trial basis. Ultimately, the Chinese Criminal
Procedure law did take this form. See section VI infta.
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ant's guilt, the conclusions at these two stages were not to be the final
ones.74 The ultimate determination could only be made after the colle-
gial bench had considered the evidence and heard the arguments itself.
The lack of a formal procedural system in the early years after the
revolution led, the articles observed, to a widespread view among judi-
cial personnel that the public security, procuracy, and courts were
"three workshops in one factory," that there was no need, once the
procuracy had conducted a thorough investigation, for the court to en-
gage in anything more than a "formality," affixing its rubber stamp to
the procuracy's findings. One consequence of this approach was that
errors in the investigatory stage could easily be confirmed at the trial
stage.75
A related deleterious effect the analysts saw of the failure to distin-
guish the court trial from the preliminary investigation was that it led
the court to take a one-sided view of the defendant, regarding him, as
the prosecution did, as being on the "opposite" side.76 This view in turn
caused the court to diminish or altogether ignore the defendant's right
to defense. Whereas during the pretrial phase the defendant was not an
equal "party" with the prosecutor, 77 at the trial stage, he acquired
"party" status equal to that of the prosecutor and, in that capacity, had
the right not only to defend himself but also to employ a defender. 7
The court should not view the exercise of that right as an obstructionist
tactic of the defendant's impeding its work, but rather should regard the
defense arguments as an aid in its search for the truth. While the "ad-
versary" or "accusatorial" model's view of the court as a passive umpire
deciding between the two sides was not adopted,79 the position was that
the court could not thoroughly fulfill its task of actively eliciting and
considering the evidence unless in the course of this process it was fully
exposed and open to both parties' presentations of the case.80
The analysis of the role of the defender served further to confirm
the general orientation 6f these early legal commentators toward a crim-
74 Liu Qinglin, supra note 64, at 48; see also Zhuang Huichen, sufra note 64, at 28.
75 Zhuang Huichen, supa note 64, at 28-29.
76 Id. at 29.
77 Qu Fu, s.upra note 64, at 24; Zhou Hengyuan, supra note 71, at 53. Both authors agree
that while during the investigatory stage the defendant is not an equal "party," he is still a
subject, and not an object, of criminal procedure. See citations supra this note; see note 65 &
accompanying text sufra.
78 Qu Fu, sufra note 64, at 24; Zhou Hengyuan, supa note 71, at 53; see also Ma Xiwu,
Regarding Several Problmkr in Present Adudication Work, 1 ZHENGFA YANJIU 3, 3 (1956).
79 The "rightist" jurists were later accused, without specific substantiation, of supporting
the adversary system with a passive judge. Shen Qisi, Citicize the "Debate (Aduersa) Pn'n'cle"
of Bourgeois Ctiminal Procedure, 1 ZHENGFA YANJIu 30 (1960). See note 96 infra.
80 Se Liu Qinglin, supra note 64, at 48-49; Ma Xiwu, supra note 78, at 3, 5-6; Zhuang
Huichen, supra note 64, at 29.
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inal process based on the presumption of innocence. The basic duty of
the defender at trial, according to a handbook on the new "people's
lawyers system" instituted in the mid-1950s was,
from the facts and the law to raise before the court materials and reasons
advantageous to the defendant, proving his innocence or the lightness of
his crime. That is to say, the lawyer can present evidence and reasons
proving that the criminal conduct of which the defendant is accused is
completely or partially lacking in factual basis, or [he can show that] ac-
cording to the law. . .the defendant's conduct cannot constitute a
crime .... 8
The defender was not to be castigated as someone who was seeking to
shield guilty defendants from criminal responsibility. In fact, the de-
fender's role, while highly "complex," was completely consistent with
the court's search for objective truth. On the one hand, the defender
was the most trusted person of the defendant. As such, it was not his
role to expose to the court evidence of the defendant's crimes that had
not otherwise been revealed. That was the duty of the prosecutor. On
the other hand, the defender in criminal procedure did not act as the
"agent" of the defendant, doing the latter's every bidding. Indeed,
while he was to point out factual and legal arguments tending to prove
the defendant's innocence or mitigate his responsibility, the defender
also bore a duty to the overall accurate administration of justice not to
make false defenses for the defendant or to be prejudiced in the defend-
ant's favor in the face of the clear correctness of the prosecution's case.
In the latter situation, however, he could still.argue various mitigating
circumstances. When he became aware of criminal evidence the court
did not have before it, his duty was to persuade the defendant to reveal
it, though, as noted, he could not reveal it himself.82
One further way in which some of the legal theorists of the 1956-57
period demonstrated their subscription to the presumption of innocence
was in their promotion of the defendant's right to remain silent at any
phase of the criminal process and their contention that the defendant's
failure to speak in his defense was not to be regarded as grounds for
finding him guilty. The defendant, the analysis went, had no duty ei-
ther to provide the court with evidence by confessing or to defend him-
self, though the court could attempt to elicit a defendant's statement by
confronting him with evidence against him and with his accusers.8
3
Confessions, furthermore, were to be viewed with caution and were not
to be used as the sole evidence in trial judgments.8 4 Not only did the
81 HUANG YUAN, OUR COUNTRY'S PEOPLE'S LAWYERS SYSTEM 13 (1956).
82 See id. at 14; Wu Lei, Study Regarding the Procedural Position of the Defender in our Countr/s
Criminal Litigation, 4 ZHENGFA YANJIu 45, 45-46 (1957); Zhou Hengyuan,supra note 71, at 54.
83 Liu QJnglin, supra note 64, at 49; Qu Fu, supra note 64, at 24.
84 Liu Qinglin, supra note 64, at 49-50; Ma Xiwu, supra note 78, at 6; see also a later
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defendant have no duty to make a statement, but neither was he to be
held legally responsible for his false statements or false accusations of
others.s 5 Once guilt had been determined, presumably on separate
grounds, a defendant's failure to speak or his false statements could be
considered in sentencing, in line with the importance in the sentencing
process of the defendant's "attitude" and the policy of "leniency to those
who confess, severity to those who resist."'s6
As has already been suggested,8 7 the extent to which the vision of
criminal procedure of the commentators in the period from 1956 to mid-
1957 was reflected in actual practice at that time is open to question, but
is not likely to have been very great. It would not be accurate to paint a
picture of China's criminal process in the mid-1950s based on the
sketches of the authors in the legal journals of the day. The evidence
available does suggest that one of the principles championed in the law
journals, the right to defense at trial, was being applied, at least in cer-
tain "routine, non-political" trials that the Chinese press chose to report
at the time 8 and that foreigners were permitted to attend. 9 The role of
defense counsel seemed significant in these cases, though evidently re-
stricted to the argument of mitigating circumstances.9° More funda-
analysis, Zhang Zipei, SeveralProblems Relating to the Use ofEvidence to Detennine the Facts ofa Case
in Cdminal Litigation, 4 ZHENGFA YANJIU 11, 13-15 (1962), trans. in J. COHEN, supra note 49, at
392-94.
85 Liu Qinglin, supra note 64, at 49; Qu Fu, supra note 64, at 24-25. This view of the
defendant's nonresponsibility for perjury is a characteristic of continental criminal procedure
and is considered an aspect of the right to silence in those systems. See Pieck, The Accsd's
Pivilege Against Sef-Incrimination In the Civil Law, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 586 (1962).
86 Qu Fu, supra note 64, at 25. The issue of the extent to which a defendant's "attitude,"
reflected in his confession or failure to confess, degree of repentance, and related factors, is to
be taken into account in the trial process has been and remains an important issue in Chinese
law. The basic view of legal commentaries in the People's Republic has always been that
attitude is a factor to be considered in sentencing but cannot be a basis for the determination
of guilt itself. For discussions of this point, see INSTITUTE OF CRIMINAL LAW RESEARCH,
CENTRAL POLITICAL-JUDICIAL CADRES' SCHOOL, LECTURES ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINAL LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1957), trans, in JOINT PUBLICA-
TIONS RESEARCH SERVICE (JPRS 13331) 188, 191-92 (1962); Cong Wenhui, The Relationship
Between Attitude Toward Admission of Guilt and the Measurement of Penalties, Guangming Ribao,
Apr. 28, 1980, at 3; Feng Shiming, Regarding the Question of the Measurement of Penalties, 4
ZHENGFA YANJIU 19, 21 (1957); Ning Hanlin, Voluntag Surrender in the Criminal Law of the
People 's Republic of China, 4 ZHENGFA YANJIU 10, 16-17 (1957); Shen Guansheng, Is a Good or
Bad "Attitude" Relevant To the Determination of Crimes and the Measurement of Penalties?, Renmin
Ribao, Apr. 21, 1980, at 5. On the traditional treatment of this issue, see D. BODDE & C.
MORRIS, supra note 36, at 231-35; Rickett, Voluntary Surrender and Confession in Chinese
Law: The Problem of Continuity, 30 J. ASIAN STUDIES 797 (1971).
87 See text accompanying notes 57-62 su ra.
88 S. LENG, supra note 14, at 142.
89 J. COHEN, supra note 49, at 449-53, 458-60.
90 See notes 88-89 supra. A foreigner about to be tried for espionage in 1955 was, interest-
ingly, told by his court-appointed counsel that he could plead guilty or not guilty. A. & A.
RICKEIT, PRISONERS OF LIBERATION 315 (1973).
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mentally, however, it seems unlikely that the system of the "open trial"
with defense counsel and other guarantees, following upon well-defined
pretrial procedures, as conceived by the law journal discussions and pre-
sumably outlined in the draft procedure code being prepared at that
time, was the norm of the day. Indeed, the legal commentaries were
generally exhortatory in tone, criticizing what the writers saw as the fail-
ings in the then current practice and proposing their analysis as a con-
ceptual framework for improvement.
In doing this, the law journals were in many respects reflecting a
general political trend in the mid-1950s away from the war communism
atmosphere of the first part of the decade with its resultant tendency
toward summary justice and lack of procedural guidelines and re-
straints. At the Eighth Communist Party Congress in September 1956,
Supreme Court President Dong Biwu noted the need to curb violations
of rights such as the right of defense and generally to strengthen the
procedural system.9' Other speeches by top leaders at the Congress re-
flected the atmosphere of relaxation of class struggle and the institution
of a new order in which objectivity and legality were to replace political
movements characterized by a disregard of form and regulation.92
Party Chairman Mao Zedong was calling for careful distinctions be-
tween revolution and counterrevolution,93 between contradictions
"among the people" and those "between the people and the enemy."'94
Even in counterrevolutionary cases, he was recommending that "no ar-
rest [should be] made in those cases where it is marginal whether to
make an arrest. '95 He was, furthermore, urging those who saw
problems in the state of China's affairs to "bloom and contend," offering
criticisms and suggestions. The political atmosphere, therefore, was con-
ducive to and consistent with the analyses of criminal procedure that
appeared during the period.
IV. CRITIQUES DURING THE ANTI-RIGHTIST AND GREAT LEAP
FORWARD PERIODS: 1958-60
The open political atmosphere, however, did not last very long. By
mid-1957, the Party had come to realize that the "blooming and con-
91 Speech by Comrade Tng Pi-wu (Dong Biwu), in 2 EIGHTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 79, 88-97 (English ed. 1956).
92 See, e.g., Speech by Comrade Lo Jui-ching (Lo Ruiqing) in id., at 98; Liu Shao-chi (Liu
Shaoqi), The Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Eighth
National Congress ofthe Party, in 1 id., at 13, especially 81-84.
93 MAO TSETUNG (Mao Zedong), On the Ten Major Relationships, in V SELECTED WORKS
OF MAO TSETuNG 284, 298-301 (English ed. 1977).
94 See MAO TSETUNG (Mao Zedong), On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the Peo-
ple, in id., at 384.
95 MAO TSETUNG (Mao Zedong), supra note 93, at 298.
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tending" was revealing much more fundamental dissatisfaction with the
basic tenets 6f the regime than it had expected. As lawyers and other
intellectuals began to make sharper and sharper criticisms, the leader-
ship began to prepare for a renewed attack on "old," "bourgeois,"
"rightist" ideas that it saw as being propagated not just to rectify short-
comings in the socialist system but to threaten such basic premises as the
leadership in all aspects of life, including law, of the Communist Party.
Public salvos against "bourgeois" legal theories began to be fired in
late 1957. The presumption of innocence and its adherents were a
prime target.96 The People's Dairy published harsh denunciations of
"rightist" judicial officials who were accused of using the specious theo-
ries of "presumption of innocence" and "benefit to the defendant" 97 to
help counterrevolutionaries and other criminals escape criminal respon-
sibility.98 For instance, these people were castigated for finding, regard-
less of reality, arguments such as the lack of criminal motive, intent, or
harmful results, to treat criminals leniently,99 for giving full credence to
the defendant's "false" arguments and for not believing the results of
investigation and prosecution.I °° These practices were said to have
caused widespread harm to the "struggle against crime" that was the
prime objective of the socialist legal system. 0 1
96 Another principle heavily criticized at this time was the continental concept ofjudicial
decision-making that judges decide cases based on their "free evaluation of the evidence," or
"inner conviction." See M. ESSAID, LA PRESOMPTION D'INNOCENCE §§ 472-90 (1971); J.
LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 78-79 (1977). This principle
was little discussed in the 1956-57 literature, though it was mentioned in passing in ways that
indicated its acceptance by the commentators of that time. See, e.g., Wang Lisheng, A Few
Considerations on Criminal Confessions, 3 ZHENGFA YANJIU 44, 47 (1956). The critiques during
the anti-rightist period generally linked this concept with that of the presumption of inno-
cence, the assumption apparently being that "rightist-minded"judges would use the excuse of
inner conviction to find guilty people innocent. The theory was also linked to the concept of
'judicial independence," also under attack as a refutation of Party leadership of judicial
work. See Ro Quan & He Fang, No Perversion of the Nature of the Peop/.r Courts i Allowed,
Renmin Ribao, Dec. 24, 1957, at 7; Tan Zhengwen, Absorb the Lessons ofExperience; Promote the
Great Leap ForwardIn Procuratorial Work, 3 ZHENGFA YANJIU 34, 39 (1958); Zhang Zipei, Criti-
cize the Bourgeois Princile of the Judge's Free Evaluation of Evidence, 2 ZHENGFA YANJIU 42 (1958),
partially trans. in J. COHEN, supra note 49, at 496. The role of the judge in the adversary
model as passive weigher of evidence between the two sides was criticized as being equally as
bourgeois and invalid as the inner conviction approach. Shen Qisi, supra note 79.
97 You liu beigao lua. This phrase was never actually used by the 1956-57 commentators,
nor is it ever defined by their later critics. Often it seems to be used by the latter to encom-
pass the presumption of innocence and other procedural rights, such as the right against self-
incrimination, seen as being to the defendant's advantage. See Wu Lei, Reject the "Doctrine of
Beneft to the Defendant in Adjudication," 4 ZHENGFA YANJIU 59 (1958).
98 TheAnti-Rightist Struggle In the High Court Achieves Great ictories, Renmin Ribao, Dec. 12,
1957, at 4; Ro Quan & He Fang, supra note 96.
99 The Anti-Rightist Stnuggle, supra note 98. See also Wu Lei, supra note 97, at 61-62.
100 Ro Quan & He Fang, supra note 96.
101 See note 98 supra. Specific cases were cited of bourgeois doctrines of "benefit to the
defendant" causing lenient treatment for real criminals. For example, a poor peasant who
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The tone of these initial polemics set the stage for the rash of com-
mentaries that appeared beginning in early 1958 in the law journals,
many by the same authors whose earlier analyses favorable to the pre-
sumption of innocence have been discussed. The primary focus of the
anti-rightist period literature on this topic was the question of delinea-
tion of the pretrial and trial functions in the criminal process. It was
stated to be wrong to claim, as the earlier analyses had done, tJhat the
procuratorial investigatory function should be clearly separated from
the function of the court. Of course, it was conceded, the prosecution
and trial activities were carried out by different agencies. The court's
role, however, was basically to "verify" or "confirm" the guilt of the
defendant as established by the prosecutor. 10 2 To illustrate that the
court's role could not really be divorced from that of the prosecutor, it
was pointed out that the court could substitute for the state prosecutor
when he did not appear in court) 03 The series of pretrial procedures-
arrest, investigation, prosecution, preliminary court hearing, and trial-
were portrayed by one legal scholar as reflecting a series of progressively
"deepening" determinations of the defendant's guilt.'0 4 Therefore, to
"presume" or "consider" 10 5 the defendant innocent until final court
killed a woman with premeditation and sold the victim's property was sentenced to only five
years because she was found to be poor and in need of money, because she confessed, and
because the victim was a leper and so her death was not so harmful. Zhang Rudong, Criticize
the OidLaw Viewpoints In Adjudication Practice and the Doctrine of Beneft to the Defendant: Discussion
Based on Two Cases, 4 ZHENGFA YANJIU 53, 54 (1958). As a demonstration of the ill effects of
the presumption of innocence doctrine, which caused time to be wasted finding evidence
favorable to the defendant and thus impeded the prompt struggle against crime, one report
noted that in one province from May to August 1957, there were 261 cases of failure to arrest
when there should have been arrest, of failure to sentence when there should have been sen-
tencing, of grave crimes lightly punished, and of the long dragging out of cases without sen-
tencing. Wu Lei & Wang Shunhua, Refute the "Doctrine of the Presumption of Innocence,"
Guangming Ribao, Dec. 13, 1957, at 2.
102 Zhang Hui, Li Changchun & Zhang Zipei, These Are Not the Basic Principles of Our Coun-
tVyIs Crimnal Procedure: Criticism of Qu Fu's "Brief Discussion of the Procedural Position of the Defend-
ant in Criminal Litigation" (see note 64 supra), 3 ZHENGFA YANJIU 76, 77-78 (1957); Zhang
Zipei, Reject the Bourgeoisie's P'nble of the "Presumption of Innocence," 1 FAXUE 37, 39 (1958).
103 Zhang Hui, Li Changchun & Zhang Zipei, supra note 102, at 78; see also Shen Qsi,
supra note 79, at 32.
104 Zhang Zipei, supra note 102, at 39.
105 The apparent terminological confusion surrounding the term "presumption" of inno-
cence that will be seen again in the context of the 1979-81 debates, section VII infra, and
which has in the view of one analyst been present in the Soviet experience, see note 326 &
accompanying text infra, seems primarily to have been fostered by the commentators of the
anti-rightist period as a weapon in their attack. The writers of the 1956-57 period had always
used the coined Chinese compound tuiding (to push the decision, presumption), orjiading (to
suppose a decision, hypothesis) to express the "presumption." Zhang Zipei, supra note 102,
and other writers, however, often used the word renwei (consider) to describe and ridicule the
concept of the presumption of innocence, interchanging that word with tuiding andjiading in
a way that seemed designed to make it appear that the proponents of the theory thought it
was the same to "consider" someone innocent as to "presume" him innocent. See Zhang
CHINESE CODE SYMPOSIUM
judgment was to divorce oneself from reality. The only possible useful-
ness of such an approach could be to serve the interests of criminals,
giving them a "legal weapon"'106 to impede the struggle of the dictator-
ship of the proletariat against its "enemies," who were at this time seen
as making up the majority, of criminal defendants. 10 7
In an Orwellian self-criticism of his previous article which adopted
the presumption of innocence approach, 08 another commentator ex-
amined all the arguments that he had earlier made in favor of the prin-
ciple-that it helped to ensure objectivity, safeguard against
preconceptions, protect the defendant's rights, and related points. He
had not realized at that time, he now explained, that China's criminal
process was oriented toward what was of benefit to the dictatorship of
the proletariat, not to criminals, and that the public security organs,
procuracies, and courts were united in a struggle against the enemy
under the close leadership of the Party. 0 9 He had not seen how "ridicu-
lous" it was to argue that one could presume innocent a person who had
been investigated, prosecuted, and sent for trial. Would it make sense,
he asked rhetorically in illustration of his new-found understanding, to
say that someone like Chiang Kaishek was innocent because he had not
gone through the trial procedure? "Guilt is guilt," after all; "innocence
is innocence.""10
In support of their arguments against the presumption of inno-
cence, the authors of this period cited statistics from earlier years show-
ing the small percentage of arrests and prosecutions that were
discovered to have been erroneous.' These figures were explained as a
natural result of the careful determination of guilt at all stages of the
process. If it became "obvious" at any point that there had been no
Zipei, supra note 102, at 39. One rightist legal scholar was directly accused of wanting to turn
the "presumption'' of innocence into a "consideration" of innocence. Huang Dao, We Mut
Completely Criticize the Absurd Doctrine of the "Presumption of innocence" (Petlimmay Self-Criticsm of
"Brief Discussion of the Prinible in Criminal Procedure of the Presumption of Innocehee" (see note 67
supra)), I FAXUE 50, 51 (1958).
106 Zhang Zipei, supra note 102, at 43.
10 7 See Li Yuepo, Isn't the '"octrine of Beneft to the Defendant" an Old Law Point of View?, 5
ZHENGFA Y~AJIu 80, 80 (1958).
108 Huang Dao, supra note 67.
109 Huang Dao, supra note 105, at 44 (sic). Another writer at this time described the three
legal organs as forming "one fist" to fight the enemy. Zhang Wuyun, Smash Prmanent Rules,
Go 1000 Li in One Day, 5 ZHENGFA YANJIU 58, 60 (1958).
110 Huang Dao, sura note 105, at 51-52.
III In Beijing.(Peking) for the year 1955 and the first half of 1956, 98.71% of counterrevolu-
tionary criminals arrested were ultimately proved guilty, and 1.29% were found to have been
innocent and wrongly arrested. Zhang Zipei, supra note 102, at 40. Another source quoting
only 1955 figures said that only 0.72% of arrests were discovered to have been wrong in the
end. Wu Yusu, Criticize the Bourgeois Pmi'zcie of the "Presumiption of Innocence," 2 ZHENGFA
YANJIu 37, 38 (1958). See note 319 infra.
1982]
TIMOTHY A. GELATT
crime or that the defendant was .not the culprit, the case would be
ended."12 If the matter was not clear, further investigation would have
to be carried out to dispel the doubt; it was no solution to decide on a
"more or less" basis, in a manner advantageous to the defendant. 113
The error of those who advocated the presumption of innocence was
that they started out with a preoccupation with that small percentage of
cases that might be wrongly handled, cases that the procuracy could
always rectify later, and thereby "bound the hands and feet" of investi-
gatory and adjudicatory personnel and gave criminals a way out.1 4
Despite the implications of this analysis, the "anti-rightist" com-
mentators were careful to point out that they were not advocating a
presumption of guilt." 1 5 Indeed, whai they claimed to be attacking was
all "presumptions," since the very concept of a presumption was viewed
as antithetical to the Party's "materialist" spirit of "seeking truth from
facts," and "taking facts as the basis and the law as the yardstick." Not
only did the presumption of innocence not add anything useful to these
guidelines, it detracted from them by injecting "idealistic" notions into
the criminal process." 6
Consistent with the approach of these writers was their view of the
right to defense and the role of the defender. The prosecutor and the
defendant, first of all, were not seen as equal parties at trial. The prose-
cutor was the tool of the dictatorship of the proletariat; the defendant
was the object of that dictatorship." 7 The commentaries upheld the
"right to defense" but they portrayed its key purpose as enabling the
dictatorship to "attack the enemy even more forcefully," not to help
"bad people" go free."I8 The theory that defense lawyers had no duty to
and indeed should not expose defendants' criminal conduct to the court
was refuted on the ground that the lawyer, like the prosecution and the
court, was to act in the interests of the people in the fight against
crime." 9 The earlier exponent of the view now under attack engaged in
a self-criticism, recognizing the folly of depicting the defense counsel as
the defendant's "most trusted" person, since a criminal could only trust
112 Zhang Zipei, supra note 102, at 44.
113 Huang Dao, supra note 105, at 53; see also Zhang Zipei, supra note 102, at 42.
114 Zhang Zipei, supra note 102, at 40.
115 See, e.g., id. at 39.
116 "Idealism" is used in a Marxist sense as the opposite of "materialism." See, e.g., Li
Baomin, The "Presumption of Innocence" Should Not Be a Prinp le of Our County4 Criminal Proce-
dure, 1 FAXUE 45, 45-46 (1958); Zhang Hui, Li Changchun & Zhang Zipei, supra note 102, at
80; Zhang Zipei, supra note 102, at 42, 43.
117 Wu Lei, supra note 97, at 61.
118 Su Yi, Should the Defender Attack Crime or Protect Cime: A Criticism of Comrade Wu Lei's
Mistaken Viewpoint Regarding the Defender's Procedural Role, 2 ZHENGFA YANjIU 76, 76 (1958),
trans. in J. COHEN, supra note 49, at 468-69.
119 Su Yi, supra note 118, at 77, trans. in J. COHEN, supra note 49, at 470.
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someone who helped him escape criminal responsibility. The defender,
of course, should do no such thing and should reveal previously undis-
covered criminal evidence if the defendant refused to confess it
himself. 120
To complete the circle, the discussions of 1958-60 cast aspersions on
the right of the defendant in criminal proceedings to remain silent. One
analyst quarreled with the idea that this was a "right," though he
seemed basically in accord with the earlier view that the failure to make
a statement was only to be considered as a factor in sentencing and not
relevant in the determination of guilt.' 2' Another author, however,
made the self-contradictory argument that, while the defendant could
not be made to shoulder the burden of raising evidence to prove his own
innocence, he should have the duty to rebut the prosecution's evidence
with counterevidence in defense. The defendant's silence in the face of
"irrefutable" prosecution evidence would indicate that he could not re-
fute it and could be taken as a "tacit admission" of guilt. The author
added the refusal to speak should be taken into account in the determi-
nation of sentence.122
The authors of these commentaries in 1958 and thereafter were the
first to recognize what has become evident in the preceding discussion,
that they were treating questions of criminal procedure not as legal, "ac-
ademic" questions, but as issues of "political standpoint."'123 The di-
chotomy was made clear: those who supported the presumption of
innocence took the standpoint of the counterrevolutionaries and other
class enemies; those who opposed it stood on the side of the Party, the
people, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Much of the space in the
law journal articles at this time was devoted to attempting to show why
the presumption of innocence, while a "progressive" concept as devel-
oped by the bourgeoisie during the feudal era to combat the presump-
tion of guilt that then prevailed, became an utterly specious phrase used
to mask the real presumption of guilt employed against the working
people when the bourgeoisie became the ruling class. 124 Once the prole-
tariat took power, the analysis went, it had no need of that empty bour-
120 Wu Lei, SefCtjiCim of the Article S tudy Regarding the rocedural Position of the Defender in
Our Countq'5 Criminal Litigation" (ree note 82 supra), 2 ZHENGFA YANJIU 78, 79, 81 (1958).
121 Wu Yusu, sufira note 111, at 40; see text accompanying note 86 supra.
122 Zhang Zipei, supra note 102, at 43.
123 Id. at 38-39; East China Political-Legal Institute Carries on Academic Discussion MetinV Refute
the Doctrine of the Presumption of Innocence, I FAXUE 48, 49 (1958).
124 See Li Baomin, supra note 116, at 45; Zhang Zipei, supra note 102, at 37. An example
frequently cited of the bourgeoisie's presumption of guilt was a provision of the French Crimi-
nal Code providing that someone without a -fixed residence who was found with goods worth
100 francs or more and who could not explain their provenance was criminally punishable.
See, e.g., Zhang Zipei, supra note 102, at 37-38.
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geois concept. Those who continued to support the presumption could
only have politically suspect motives for doing so.
If the discussions of the presumption of innocence and related crim-
inal procedure questions in the 1956-57 period were more a statement of
aspirations than a description of reality, the general approach of the
commentators of the anti-rightist era seemed to be reflected in large part
in the actual criminal process at that time. The "great leap forward" of
1958-61, in which the policy was to implement industrialization and
communization at breakneck speed, had its ramifications in the legal
arena. While the formal courtroom trial with defense lawyer and colle-
gial panel did apparently continue to occur at least in some cases, 125 an
increasingly popular model in the late 1950s was apparently the "on-
the-spot" method of handling cases, characterized by close cooperation
and coordination among the officials of the public security organs,
procuracies, and courts. 126 "Work groups" consisting of representatives
of all three legal branches would go to the scene of crimes and arrest,
investigate, and adjudicate, often in an educational "mass" setting, in
extremely short periods of time.' 27 This approach was seen as a much
more efficient and effective way to fight counterrevolution and other
crime than a criminal procedure system based on formal rules. Only by
"smashing permanent rules" and by "having the courage to innovate"
with the system of "cooperation" among all legal branches, it was said,
could the work of handling cases "leap forward."' 28
Procedural constructs such as the presumption of innocence would
not seem to have had any place in the great leap forward scenario. Nev-
ertheless, one local judge, in describing his approach to on-the-spot
work, did stress the importance of avoiding both judgments that "unjus-
tifiably acquit criminals" and those that "erroneously convict innocent
persons." In order to ensure that such errors would not occur, he pre-
scribed the following guidelines: "do not make a judgment if the facts
are not clear; do not make a judgment if the evidence is not sufficient;
125 See J. COHEN, supra note 49, at 453-58 for an account of a 1959 trial witnessed by a
Japanese delegation.
126 See Li Lin, A Few Realizations In the Great Leap Forward In Judicial Work, 5 ZHENGFA
YANJIU 42 (1958); Liu Xiufeng & Huang Shishan, Penetrate Deepy Into the Masses, Rely on the
Masses, Take the Mnas Line in Handling Cares, 5 ZHENGFA YANJIU 47 (1958); Zhang Wuyun,
szpra note 109, partially trans. in J. COHEN, supra note 49, at 474-76.
127 One on-the-spot work group investigated, prosecuted, and adjudicated 73 cases in
twelve days. Zhang Wuyun, supra note 109, at 59, trans. in J. COHEN, supra note 49, at 476. In
an experiment in Canton, coordination among the three legal organs and elimination of "un-
necessary procedures and steps" reduced total work time from arrest to judgment to as little
as just under thirty hours. Canton r Political-Legal Departments Experiment With Cooperation in Case
Handling, Nanfang Ribao (Southern Daily), Mar. 30, 1958, at 3, trans in J. COHEN, supra note
49, at 479-80.
128 Zhang Wuyun, supra note 109, at 59, trans in J. COHEN, supra note 49, at 476.
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do not make a judgment if the nature of the case is still vague; and do
not make a judgment if the policy is unclear."' 29 While this advice may
not reflect a presumption of innocence at least it discouraged the oppo-
site presumption. The extent to which this advice was followed in the
heated political atmosphere of the anti-rightist period, when legal or-
gans were under great pressure to uncover their share of class enemies or
be considered ideologically lax, 130 and during the frenzied campaigns of
the great leap forward, is of course hard to determine.
Indeed, after about 1960, the state, both practical and theoretical,
of China's criminal procedure, becomes increasingly difficult to study.
The sole remaining law journal had ceased by that time to publish ma-
terial on criminal procedural issues, except for occasional critiques of
bourgeois systems. The beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966
saw the one law journal cease publication altogether. Another thirteen
years were to pass before legal journals resumed. Then, in the context of
a revived legal order in which laws, including a criminal procedure
code, were being prepared, discussion began of the presumption of inno-
cence and other questions of criminal procedure that had for so long
been "forbidden zones."' 31
V. THE RESUMPTION OF DISCUSSIONS: 1979
A highly favorable analysis of the presumption of innocence ap-
peared on February 17, 1979, in the official People's Dai', 132 indicating
that there were at least some in the leadership who believed it beneficial
to consider "rehabilitating" this politically tainted doctrine. This short
newspaper article contained a more concise and lucid analysis of the
presumption of innocence than any of the law review commentaries of
the 1956-57 period. The article reiterated the understanding of the au-
thors of that earlier era that public security and procuratorial activities
should not be taken as determinative of guilt and that only the trial
judgment should resolve that question. The People's Daily analyst made
explicit what the earlier writers had only implied in their general ap-
proach, that a major function of the presumption of innocence was to
provide a solution for cases that, because of insufficient evidence, could
not be resolved one way or the other. Refuting the anti-rightist period
claim, still being made, that the notion of "seeking truth from facts" was
a sounder theory than the presumption of innocence and indeed obvi-
129 Li Zejun, Realizations From My Adjidication Work, 1 ZHENGFA YANJIu 48, 51 (1959), trans.
in J. COHEN, supra note 49, at 463.
130 Compare J. COHEN, supra note 49, at 261-64.
131 Tian Cai, A Question Worth Investigating, Renmin Ribao, Feb. 17, 1979, at 3, trans in
FBIS-CHI, Mar. 7, 1979, at E7.
132 Id
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ated the need for the presumption, 3 3 the writer observed that it was
precisely in those unclear cases where there were insufficient facts from
which to seek truth that an in dubiopro reo 13 4 function of the presumption
of innocence must come into play. One could not, he noted, hold de-
fendants indefinitely while prolonging the investigation, as Chinese legal
sources now admit had been a common practice both before and during
the Cultural Revolution. 3 5 One presumption or another was needed to
resolve unclear cases after a certain, unspecified, amount of time had
elapsed. Clearly, the article concluded, the presumption of innocence
was preferable to the presumption of guilt in these circumstances and
better embodied the spirit of seeking truth from facts. 136
The first law review article on the subject, appearing soon after the
Peoples Daily discussion, was in utter contrast to the latter, indicating
that a wide divergency of views existed on issues of criminal procedure
as the draft procedure code underwent revision and discussion. Echoing
the anti-rightist period approach to the presumption of innocence, two
133 See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra; text following note 138 infla.
134 In the continental systems of France and Germany this maxim is closely linked with the
presumption of innocence. The two doctrines are described by one French jurist as corollaries
of each other, together giving the court guidance in coming to its inner conviction. Patarin,
Le Particularisme de la theorie despreuves en Droit Pinal, in QUELQUES ASPECTS DE L'AUTONOMIE
DE DROIT PENAL 38-39 (G. Stefani ed. 1956); see also M. ESSAID, supra note 96, §§ 491-506;
Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal
Cases, 77 YALE L. J. 880, 880 n.3 (1968).
The People's Daily article discussed in the text seemed to be stressing the use of the in dubio
pro reo approach for pretrial proceedings. In other systems, the concept is usually discussed
primarily in connection with the trial, but at least in principle appears to be accepted as
relevant to earlier stages as well.
In the common law, the presumption of innocence has been identified not with in dubio
pro reo so much as with the distinct, though related, concept of the prosecutor's burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that began to develop in the mid-nineteenth century. Pat-
terson v. State, 21 Ala. 571 (1852); State v. Tibbetts, 35 Maine 81 (1852); 1 P. TAYLOR,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 133 (1887).
135 Cases of accused being held for three, five, eight or ten years were not rare before and
during the Gang of Four era, according to one account. In one case, still unresolved as of
1979, an accused had been held for eighteen years; there was insufficient evidence to hold a
trial, but there remained suspicion. Lan Quanpu, The Pincible of the Presumption of Imocence zs
Beneftial to the Correct Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law, 4 MINZHU Yu FAZHI 15, 16
(1979). See a/so Legal Research Institute, supra note 15.
136 The author advocated in closing that the presumption of innocence-or "at least. . .its
spirit"-be considered for inclusion in the Criminal Procedure Law then under preparation.
In this and in his general in dubio pro reo approach, the Peoples Daiy commentator was re-
soundingly seconded by one of the underground publications appearing in Peking at that
time. Only by releasing people against whom sufficient evidence could not be obtained, an
article in the April Fi)h Forum proclaimed, was it "possible to insure that the broad masses of
innocent people will not suffer injustice." Hong An, The Principle of the "Assumption (Presunp-
tion) of Innocence"Must Be Implemented, 6 Siwu LUNTAN (APRIL FIFrH FORUM) 4 (1979), tran.
in THE FIFrH MODERNIZATION: CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1978-1979 105 (J.
Seymour ed. 1980).
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commentators in Legal Research 3 7 described the doctrine as having a
"bourgeois class character," being "metaphysical," "idealistic," and
"unscientific."' 38 "Seeking truth from facts" was stated to be a suffi-
cient basis for the accuracy of China's criminal procedure. Like the
1958 analysts, the authors maintained that there should not be a stulti-
fying concern for erroneous decisions, since these would be rectified in
line with the policy of "if there are errors, they must be corrected."'13 9
Responding to this position, the next commentary on the subject
agreed that the presumption of innocence was a principle of bourgeois
origin, of little value in contemporary bourgeois society, but contended
that that was no reason for the developing socialist legal system to reject
it without analysis. 140 The principle, properly understood as a suspen-
sion of judgment until guilt had been proved by evidence and a judg-
ment rendered at trial, was a "scientific" one that could with great
benefit inform the socialist legal system. Experience had shown, the au-
thors contended, that failure to adopt the presumption of innocence as a
"guiding thought" at all stages of criminal procedure had led to the
opposite presumption and to the view that the trial was a formality.
Under this view, anyone arrested was considered a criminal and could
be treated like a criminal-made, for instance, to perform uncompen-
sated forced labor while awaiting trial.' 4 ' The authors felt that the
court, on the contrary, should not be "only a place for sentencing" but
should be the place where the "judgment of right and wrong," ie., of
guilt or innocence, was actually rendered. 142
A juxtaposition of diametrically opposite views on the presumption
137 Wang Zhaosheng & Wei Ruoping, View on the Pincible of the 'Presumption ofInnocence", 2
FAXUE YANJIU 47 (1979). Faxue Yanjiu, published by the Legal Research Institute of the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, began formal publication in 1979 and is the successor to
Zhengfa Yanj'u, Political-Legal Research, see note 63 supra.
138 Wang Zhaosheng & Wei Ruoping, supra note 137, at 47. The familiar points about the
speciousness of the presumption in the bourgeois countries were reviewed, complete with the
French vagrant provision. See note 124 & accompanying text sup ra.
139 Wang Zhaosheng & Wei Ruoping, supra note 137, at 48. Recall text accompanying
note 114 supra.
14o Zhao Hong & Dou Jixiang, Understanding of the Pdndple of the '"resumption ofInnocence", 3
FAXUE YANjiu 47, 47 (1979).
141 Though information is scanty, it appears that at least in some cases in the past, prison-
ers in China in detention before formal sentencing have been made to perform labor. See BAO
RuO-WANG (J. PASQUALINI) & R. CHELMINSKI, PRISONER OF MAO 83-101 (1973); A. & A.
RIcKETT, supra note 90, at 272-86. "Reform through labor" is, technically, a criminal pun-
ishment that should only apply after a judgment of guilt and sentencing. AcT OF THE PEO-
PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR REFORM THROUGH LABOR (passed at the 222d Meeting of
the Government Administration Council, Aug. 26, 1954, promulgated by the Government
Administration Council, Sept. 7, 1954), art. 17, 1954 FALING HUiLBAN (COMPENDIUM OF
LAWS AND DECREES 350 [hereinafter cited as FLHB]), trans. in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL DOcU-
MENrTS, sra note 57, at 240.
142 Zhao Hong & Dou Jixiang, supra note 140, at 48.
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of innocence was thus found in the months before the release of the Chi-
nese CP. In the background of the debate was a juridico-political de-
bate on the question of the "inheritability of law." The issue was
whether all "old," "bourgeois" laws and legal concepts had necessarily
to be rejected out of hand by a socialist legal system, or whether bour-
geois law could be selectively adopted and adapted to meet the needs of
the socialist system. 143 This question had been discussed in the open
period of 1956 and early 1957, 44 before the anti-rightist movement at
least temporarily decided the issue. In 1979, as in the 1950s, differing
positions on the "inheritability" issue informed the debates on many
specific legal questions such as the presumption of innocence.
VI. THE PLACE OF THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN THE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF 1979: ANALYSIS WITH
COMPARATIVE REFERENCES TO THE SOVIET,
WEST EUROPEAN, AND REPUBLIC OF
CHINA CODES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The debates on the presumption of innocence have continued in
the past two years to occupy space in China's several new law.journals.
Before examining the arguments made' in late 1979 and thereafter, an
analysis should be undertaken of relevant aspects of the Chinese CP
passed July 1, 1979, which forms the backdrop for those arguments.
Some comparison of the Chinese CP with other continental-model legis-
lation, especially that of the Soviet Union, will be useful in addressing
the key issue regarding the Chinese CP that concerns us-what type of
framework does it provide for the operation of a presumption of
innocence?
The introductory section of the Chinese CP, setting forth basic
principles, does not contain any provision that clearly reflects the pre-
sumption of innocence, though in no place can it be said to negate or
deny the presumption. The Soviet Union's Basic Principles of Criminal
Procedure 45 provide that "[n]o one may be held guilty of a crime and
143 See Li Changdao, Old Law Cannot Be Criticaly Inherited But May Ony Be Used For Reference,
3 FAXUE YANjIU 45 (1979); Lin Rongnian, BriefDircussion on the Inheritability of Law, 1 FAxUE
YANJIu 13 (1979).
144 For a discussion and sources, see F. Chiang, Chinese Communist Attitude (sic) Toward
the Inheritability of Old Law (1978) (unpublished LL.M. Paper, Harvard Law School).
145 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE USSR AND THE UNION
REPUBLICS (1958), trans in 3 LAW IN EASTERN EUROPE 113 (Z. Smirmai ed. 1959) [hereinaf-
ter "BASIC PRINCIPLES" in the text and notes; page citations are to the translation cited
supra]. The Basic Principles are applicable throughout the USSR. The Criminal Procedure
Code of 1960 of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) (the largest of the
union republics of the USSR), as amended [hereinafter "RUSSIAN CCP" in the text and
notes], will be cited as well as the Basic Principles in discussing Soviet procedure. Page cita-
tions are to H. BERMAN & J. SPINDLER, THE SOVIET CODES OF LAW 158 (W. Simon ed.
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undergo criminal punishment except by judgment of the court,"' 46 a
principle that has been described by some Soviet jurists as a basis for the
presumption of innocence in Soviet law. 1 7 The Chinese OP makes a
statement that appears to have little other than jurisdictional signifi-
cance: "The people's courts are responsible for adjudication. No other
organ, organization or individual has the right to exercise these pow-
ers.' 48 The principle of taking "facts as their basis, and. . .law as their
yardstick" is prescribed for the courts, procuracies and public security
organs.' 49 Absent are any provisions comparable to the Soviet state-
ments that all criminal procedure organs shall ensure the exposition of
the "circumstances implicating or exonerating the accused, as well as
the circumstances aggravating or mitigating his guilt," and that at none
of the stages of the criminal process may the burden of proof be shifted
to the accused.' 50
From the start, the Chinese OP contains language which appears to
contradict a presumption of innocence. In the provisions on jurisdic-
tion, for instance, the phrase place of "the crime," rather than "alleged"
crime, is used.' 5' Probably no great significance should be attributed to
these particular points of drafting, since other codes are characterized by
similar language 52 and, it might be recalled, the sixth amendment to
the United States Constitution gives "the accused" the right to trial by a
jury of "the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed." 53
In another, more important context, however, the Chinese OP
adopts terminology that could be seen to belie a presumption of inno-
cence. In the provisions on arrest and detention, reference is made alter-
nately to "defendants"' 5 4 and "offenders,"'' 55 leaving the impression
1980). In cases where the Russian CCP contains an identical provision to the Basic Princi-
ples, the Russian CCP provision will be cited in the notes after the Basic Principles provision;
the translation quoted will in such cases be that of the Basic Principles provision in the trans-
lation cited supaa.
146 BASIC PRINCIPLES, art. 7, at 117; RUSSIAN COP, art. 13, at 166.
147 See Petrukhin, The Presumption ofInnocence-A Constitutional Pinciple in Soviet Cminal Law,
trans. in Current Digest of the Soviet Press [hereinafter cited as CDSP], Mar. 28, 1979, at 14.
See also Osakwe, Due Process of Law Under Contemporaq, Soviet Criminal Procedure, 50 TuLANE L.
REv. 266, 316 n.217 (1976).
148 CHINESE CP, art. 3.
149 Id., art. 4.
150 BASIC PRINCIPLES, art. 14, at 119; RUSSIAN COP, art. 20, at 167-68. See note 257 &
accompanying text infra.
151 CHINESE CP, arts. 19, 20.
152 See, e.g., RussLAN CCP, arts. 41, 42, at 174.
153 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
154 Beigao. CHINESE CP, art. 38.
155 Renfan. CHINESE CP, art. 39.
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that the drafters considered these terms to be interchangeable. 5 6 Fur-
thermore, the primary standard for arrest of an "offender" is that "the
principal facts of [his] crime have already been clarified."' 157 Commenta-
ries on this provision158 explain that it requires that sufficient investiga-
tion have been done of the "principal" criminal facts to uncover
"complete, irrefutable" evidence of the crime.159 In the absence of such
evidence, the procuracy, before rendering a decision to approve arrest,
must require supplementary police investigation.1 60
By contrast, the Russian CCP161 establishes a clear demarcation,
followed consistently in the Code, between the "person suspected
of. . .a crime,"'162 who remains in that posture until formally accused,
and the "accused."' 163 For the decision by the investigatory authority to
"prosecute" a person as "the accused," the standard is that "there exists
sufficient evidence to provide a basis for presenting an accusation of the
commission of a crime."' 164 Under the Russian CCP the decision to ap-
156 One Chinese analysis appears to support the theory that in fact the Chinese legal sys-
tem may consider "offender," renfan, as synonymous with "defendant," beigao, CHINESE CP,
arts. 38, 39 despite the use of the character/an, meaning offense or crime, in the term. The
analysis points out that it is necessary to distinguish between a renfan, who is undergoing the
preliminary stages of the criminal process, and a zuifan, criminal, who has been tried and
found guilty. Xie Lin, Ofenders and Ciminals, Zhongguo Fazhi Bao (China Legal System
Weekly), Jan. 23, 1981, at 3. Another commentary seems consistent in saying that a beigao is
not to be treated as a zufan. Liu Wenhua, 'Defendants' Are Not the Same as CriminaLr,' 8
MINZHU Yu FAZHI 34 (1980).
157 CHINESE CP, art. 40 (emphasis added).
158 In what follows, reference will be made to three commentaries on the Criminal Proce-
dure Law. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE TEACHING SECTION, BEIING POLITICAL-LEGAL INSTI-
TUTE, LECTURES ON THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (1979) [hereinafter cited as LECTURES]; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE TEACHING GROUP,
LAW FACULTY OF CHINA PEOPLE'S UNIVERSITY, BASIC KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1980) [hereinafter cited as BASIC
KNOWLEDGE]; WANG SHUNHUA, Xu YICHU, ZHANG ZHONGLIN, XIAO XIANFU & CHUAN
KUANZHI, ANNOTATION OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA (1980) [hereinafter cited as ANNOTATION]. These commentaries should not be
taken as official; they are simply widely available books by leading legal scholars and educa-
tors intended to elucidate the law of criminal procedure for lay people and legal professionals
alike. In general they are consistent with each other, though wording and emphasis may vary
on certain points. There is no basis for assuming that, insofar as these commentaries expand
upon the Chinese CP itself, they have the force of law.
159 LECTURES, supra note 158, at 59; ANNOTATION, srupra note 158, at 45.
160 CHINESE CP, art. 47; see ANNOTATION, supra note 158, at 53.
161 See note 145 supra.
162 RUSSIAN CCP, art. 90, at 190.
163 Id., art. 46, at 175-76.
164 Id., art. 143, at 213. This accusation process, not present in the Chinese system, appears
to take place at some point after the case is "initiated," before the initial interrogation of the
defendant. For a case to be initiated, upon a report, voluntary surrender, direct discovery by
the authorities, and so forth, there must exist "sufficient data indicating the indicia of a
crime." Id., art. 108, at 197. The CHINESE CP, art. 61, has a simliar standard for "initiating"
a case.
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ply a measure of restraint, including arrest, 165 is based upon the danger
of escape and other factors of this nature.' 66 There is no reference to
"evidence of the crime" at this stage. The Code of the Republic of
China ("ROC Code") 167 provides for detention when an "accused" is
"strongly suspected of having committed an offense." I6s
An issue of major relevance to our concern is presented by the Chi-
nese CP's provisions regarding the pretrial right to defense. The right to
defense by outside counsel, as opposed to defense pro se, during the in-
terrogations at the investigatory phase of the procedure, is never explic-
itly denied in the Chinese CP, but its denial may be gleaned from a
series of provisions.169 Defense counsel apparently may not become in-
volved in a case until after the prosecution has decided to prosecute and
the preliminary court hearing 170 has ended in a decision to hold a full
trial of the case. 171 After that point, the lawyer "may consult the mater-
ials of the case at bar and acquaint himself with the circumstances of the
case [and] meet and correspond with the defendant in custody."' 72 The
Soviet legislation gives the lawyer the right to become involved at a sig-
nificantly earlier stage-in most cases, at the time the preliminary inves-
tigation is completed but before the decision to prosecute has been
rendered.' 73 It also seems to allow counsel a more significant role after
165 Referred to in the Russian COP as "confinement under guard." See RUSSIAN COP, art.
96, at 191-92.
166 See RUSSIAN COP, arts. 89, at 190; 96, at 191-92.
167 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (promulgated by the
National Government, Jan. 1, 1935), as amended, LATEST COMPLETE BOOK OF THE SIX
LAWs 337 (Zhang Zhiben ed. 1975) [hereinafter in text and notes "ROC Code"]. Page cita-
tions are to translation in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 331
(1967).
168 ROC CODE, art. 76, at 353.
169 CHINESE CP, arts. 26-30; arts. 62-66; see also note 171 & accompanying text infa.
170 See text accompanying notes 201-06 infra.
171 CHINESE CP, art. 110, para. 2.
172 Id. art. 29. A set of rules published in May 1981 by the Supreme People's Court, the
Supreme People's Procurate, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of Justice
spells out the rights of the lawyer under article 29 and provides rules for their implementa-
tion. For instance, it is stipulated that a lawyer may take notes on the case file. See report in
FBIS-CHI, May 15, 1981, at K23.
173 BASIC PRINCIPLES, art. 22, as revised in 1972, provides that defense counsel "shall be
permitted to participate in a case from the moment the accused is informed of the completion
of the preliminary investigation and is presented with all the proceedings of the case to be-
come acquainted with them."I By decree of the procurator, defense counsel may be permitted
to participate in the case from the moment the accusation is presented, thus giving him a role
during the preliminary investigation. In addition, participation of defense counsel during the
preliminary investigation is obligatory in cases involving minors, deaf, dumb, or blind defend-
ants or defendants whose handicaps otherwise prevent them from exercising their right to
defense. H. BERMAN, SOvIET CRIMINAL LAw AND PROCEDURE 218 (1972). See also RUSSIAN
CCP, arts. 47, at 176, 49 at 177; 211(2)(j), at 238. The provisions for permissive or obligatory
participation of counsel during the preliminary investigation represent a compromise position
on the issue of expanding the right to counsel at the pretrial stage, an issue that has been hotly
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his entry than the Chinese CP affords him. 174 The ROC Code allows
the accused to employ an advocate at any time after initiation of prose-
cution, and provides that the advocate may examine and copy the rec-
ord and, generally, interview and correspond with the accused in
detention."75 The major Western European systems generally allow
counsel to participate from at least as early a point as interrogation dur-
ing the preliminary investigation.176
The Chinese CP provides that the preliminary investigation phase
commences with interrogation of the defendant and also includes ques-
tioning of witnesses, search, and other investigatory activities.' 77 In in-
debated in Soviet legal circles. See H. BERMAN, supra, at 53, 54, 85; see also Alexeyev, We
Discuss Problems of Soviet Law: On the Participation of the Defense In the Prehiminary Investigation,
trans. in CDSP, July 16, 1958, at 16; Shafir, Right to Defense in Soviet Criminal Procedure and
Possibilities of Its Enlargement, trans. in THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 103 (J. Hazard, I. Shapiro
& P. Maggs eds. 1969 ed.). The Yugoslav Criminal Procedure Code was amended to give
counsel full rights to participate from the preliminary investigation stage. Damaska, Compara-
tive Reflections On Reading the Amended Yugoslav Code: Interrogation of Defendants in Yugoslav Criminal
Procedure, 61 J. CRIM. L. C. & P.S. 168, 175 (1970).
174 In addition to consulting with the accused and examining the materials of the case, the
defense counsel may submit evidence and petition for supplementary investigation. He may
submit petitions to the procurator who decides on prosecution and to the preliminary court
hearing that decides whether to bring the case for trial, and may also appeal from measures
and decisions of the investigator and procurator. He may demand the recusal of investigators
or procurators. BASIC PRINCIPLES, art. 23, at 125; RUSSIAN CCP, arts. 51, at 178; 63, 64 at
182; 202, 204, at 234-35; 223, at 243.
175 ROC Code, arts. 27 para. 1, at 340-41; 33, 34, at 342. The issue of expanding the
pretrial participation of counsel is currently being debated in Taiwan as part of discussions of
revision of the Criminal Procedure Code. Author's conversation with member of Taiwan
(Republic of China) Bar (March 1981).
176 France, CODE DE PROCEDURE PNALE, art. 114, at 119 [hereinafter cited as C. PR.
PEN.] (page citations to Petits Codes Dalloz (21st ed. 1979-80)). The cited article permits
counsel to participate beginning at the second interrogation session of the pretrial investiga-
tion conducted by the investigating judge, orjuge dinstruction. At the first such session, the
accused is informed of his right to choose counsel, and is informed of his right to silence. For
a discussion of the development of the pretrial role of counsel in France, see M. ESSAID, supra
note 96, §§ 384-411. The possibility exists in the French system that the juge dinstruction will
elect to question the defendant as a witness, in which event the defendant has no right to
counsel. The judge may not do this "with a view to causing the right of defense to fail" ("dans
le dessein defaire ichec aux droits de la difense') in the case of defendants against whom there exist
grave and consistent indications of guilt ("des indices graves et concordants de culpabiliti'). C. PR.
PEN., art. 105, at 116.
In the West German system, counsel may be present from an earlier stage than in the
French, namely from the time of initial police detention and investigation. See GERMAN
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, arts. 93ff. at 216ff. [hereinafter cited as STPO] (page cita-
tions to T. Kleinknecht ed. 1977). On the development and expansion of counsel's pretrial
role in West Germany, see Ackermann, Garanties de la Defense Pendant la Procdure Priliminaire, 24
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 71 (1953); Robinson & Eser, LeDroit du Privenu Au
Silence et Son Droit A Ere Assist Par un Difenseur au Cours de la Phase Ptjudiciaire en Allemagne et
auxEtats-Unisd'Amnque, 22 REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE Daorr PENAL COMPARE
567, 578-85 (1967).
177 CHINESE CP, arts. 62-90.
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terrogating the defendant, the interrogator is to begin by asking him
"whether or not he has engaged in criminal conduct" and then allow
him to "make a statement of the circumstances of his guilt or a defense
of his innocence."' 78 A similar scenario seems contemplated by the So-
viet procedure. 179 In addition, the Russian CCP requires that the ac-
cused be informed at the commencement of the preliminary
investigation of his right to know what he is accused of, to "give expla-
nations" concerning the accusation, to present evidence, to submit peti-
tions, and to submit challenges and appeals from actions and decisions
of pretrial agencies. 180 The accused, in addition to his counsel, has the
right to become acquainted with the case files.181 None of these rights
are afforded by the Chinese CP itself, though commentaries 82 state the
interrogator's duty to tell the defendant the reasons for his arrest and
subpoena for interrogation 183 and also refer to the defendant's right to
request the calling of witnesses and the obtaining of evidence, requests
that should be granted as long as they are "significant to clarifying the
case."' 84 One Chinese commentary makes the additional point that the
defendant's opportunity for defense during the preliminary interroga-
tion must be regarded seriously and that the defendant's denial of guilt
must not be used to shift the burden of proof onto him.185
On the question of the right to silence, at the pretrial interrogation
stage, the Chinese CP provides that the defendant "shall answer the
questions put by the investigation personnel according to the facts,"
though it gives a limited right to refuse to answer questions that "have
no relation to the case at bar."' 86 The Chinese CP provides no compa-
rable right at other stages of the process. By contrast, the Russian CCP
is silent on the issue of refusal to answer as regards the pretrial phase,
but provides an indirect right during trial by prescribing that the person
presiding over the trial "shall eliminate questions having no relation to
the case." 187 Neither the Chinese nor Soviet Code provides any more
general "right to silence," in the sense of not making a statement or
178 Id. art. 64.
179 BASIC PRINCIPLES, art. 13, at 119; RUSSIAN CCP, art. 150, at 215.
180 RUSSIAN CCP, art. 149, at 215; art. 46, at 175-76.
181 Id., art. 201, at 233-34.
182 But see last sentence of note 158 supra.
183 BASIC KNOWLEDGE, sura note 158, at 103. The passage cited seems to assume that this
duty is "in accordance with the provision of the Criminal Procedure Law."
184 Id. at 104; LECTURES, upra note 158, at 71-72.
185 LECTURES, supra note 158, at 74. In this connection, it is interesting to note a provision
of the ROC Code that if the accused at interrogation makes an explanation of the facts
favorable to himself, he shall be ordered to "explain his method of proof." ROC Code, art.
96, at 358.
186 CHINESE CP, art. 64.
187 RuSSIAN CCP, art. 280, at 260.
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testifying, though in both cases such a right at both pretrial and trial
stages may logically be inferred from the general provision of a duty to
testify on the part of witnesses coupled with the absence of such a duty
for defendants. 188
The Chinese CP provides that in most cases the public security or-
gans are charged with the preliminary investigation, though in certain
specified types of cases the procuracy handles those activities.18 9 In the
Soviet Union, on the other hand, in most cases the pretrial investigator
is an employee of the procuracy, the same agency that decides on prose-
cution. Though provision is made for the investigation to be under-
taken by the investigator independently,'90 broad powers exist for the
procurator to exercise control over the investigation. 191
The issue of division of pretrial functions is related to the question
of the standard employed to decide whether to recommend a criminal
trial after investigation by the last authority involved before the case is
given to the court. In the Chinese scheme, this decision is made by the
procuracy, in the Soviet system, the procurator per se as opposed to his
investigatory employees, and in France, by the examining judge. The
Chinese CP requires the procuracy to "consider" cases sent up from the
public security organs; such consideration may include supplementary
investigation. The supplementary investigation, however, is not neces-
sarily performed by the procuracy; it may be done by the public security
188 CHINESE CP, art. 37, says: "Anyone with knowledge about the circumstances of the
case has the duty to testify." This could be read to apply to defendants, but the surrounding
context indicates that it is meant to apply to witnesses. Cf. id., arts. 36, 37 para. 2. A com-
mentary explicitly states: "This article [37] pertains to the duty of witnesses to testify." AN-
NOTATION, supra note 158, at 40. This provision applies to the trial stage, cf. CHINESE CP,
arts. 36, 115, and may be juxtaposed with the provision of id., art. 118, that the "defendant
shall make his statement", which does not seem to imply a duty to do so. Id., art. 68, ex-
presses a duty for pretrial witnesses ("legal responsibility to be borne for... the concealment
of criminal evidence"), which provision may in turn be coupled with the allowance of the
defendant's statement at the pretrial stage in id., art. 64 ("let him make a statement'). Com-
parable for the trial stage in the Soviet system are RUSSIAN CCP, art. 282, at 261, giving
witnesses a duty to testify, and id., art. 280, at 260-61, providing that the presiding judge shall
propose that the person on trial testify; at the pretrial stage, see similarly id., arts. 158, at 218;
150, at 215; see also id, arts. 73, at 185; 77, at 186.
Western European codes are not always consistent or explicit in their provision of a right
to remain silent at various stages of the process, but the right is generally recognized to exist
at all stages in Western European systems. Pieck, supra note 85, at 585-86; Robinson & Eser,
supra note 176, at 569-76.
189 CHINESE CP, art. 13. Criminal cases to be handled only upon complaint (see CHINESE
CL, art. 87) and other "minor criminal cases ... that do not require the conducting of an
investigation" are taken directly by the courts, which may carry on mediation. CHINESE CP,
art. 13.
190 BASIC PRINCIPLES, art. 30, at 131; RUSSIAN CCP, art. 127, at 205-6.
191 Id; see also RUSSIAN CCP, arts. 211-12, at 237-38. For discussion of this point, see
Fletcher, The Prtesanpion ofInnocence in the Soviet Union, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1203, 1215 (1968).
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organs at the request of the procuracy. I92 Upon completion of its con-
sideration, the procuracy "shall make a decision to prosecute
and. . .initiate a public prosecution" in cases where it considers "that
the facts of the defendant's crime have already been clarified, that the
evidence is reliable and complete and that according to law criminal
responsibility should be investigated."'' 93 In the Soviet system, the proc-
urator reviews the case after preliminary investigation. 94 His decision
to prosecute is based, according to the accepted analysis of Soviet jurists
and the implications of two legislative provisions, on his determination
of the defendant's guilt. 9 5 At first glance this appears to be a higher
standard than the Chinese CP provides, though the implication of the
reference in the relevant Chinese provision to the "facts of the defend-
ant's crime" might render the distinction less clear.196
192 CHINESE CP, arts. 95, 96, 99. Interrogation of the defendant at this stage, however,
must be performed by the procuracy. Id., art. 98.
193 Id., art. 100.
194 RUSSIAN CCP, arts. 213-14, at 239.
195 See Fletcher, supra note 191, at 1215 n.40. The provision of BASIC PRINCIPLES, art. 17,
at 121, 154 n.67a, and RUSSIAN CCP, art. 71, at 185, that procurators must evaluate evidence
according to their "inner conviction" indicates that they are deciding on the guilt question,
since that is the only question to which this continental concept is generally considered rele-
vant. See Fletcher, supra note 191, at 1215 n.40; see note 96supra and sources there cited. But
see note 196 infra on the French situation.
Even more telling is BASIC PRINCIPLES, art. 15, at 121, providing: "During thepreliminag
investigation and at the hearing in court [it] must be proved. . . that the accused is guilty of the
commission of the crime" (emphasis added). See alro BASIC PRINCIPLES, art. 40, at 139; Rus-
SIAN CCP, art. 248, at 250.
196 CHINESE CP, art. 100. Both the Chinese and Soviet standards appear at least on the
surface to be higher than those of other systems considered. For example, the ROC Code
standard requires evidence "sufficient to show that an accused is suspected of having commit-
ted an offense." ROC Code, art. 251, para. 1, at 396.
In France, thejuge dinstraction decides if there are charges against the accused constitut-
ing a violation of penal law ("s'il exist contre l'inculp6 des charges constitutives d'infraction A
la loi prnale"), C. PR. PEN., art. 176, at 156. On review, the chambre d'accusation considers if
there are "charges sujsantes." Id., art. 211, at 175. It appears to be the view of some French
jurists that the standard of "charges constitutives," while not requiring the conviction of the
juge distruction that the defendant is guilty, does require his "conviction. . .that it is proba-
ble that" the defendant is guilty. M. ESSAID, supra note 96, § 483 (quoting Faustine H6lie).
In this view, the doctrine of intime conviction does apply to the decision to send a case to court,
though it does not require at this stage an absolute determination of guilt. Id. §§ 482-84.
Another French scholar contends that thejuge dinstruction does not send a case for trial unless
"grave presumptions of guilt have first been established." Vouin, The Protection of the Accusedin
French CriminalProcedure Part !, 5 INT. AND COMP. L.Q. 1, 5 (1956). On the other hand, other
jurists interpret the "charges constitutives" standard as being much lower, and as not address-
ing the issue of guilt at all, stressing the importance of separating the decision made by the
juge dnstrction from that later to be made by the trial court. See, e.g., N~rac, Les Garanties
d'Impartialiti du Juge Ripressif, I LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE 2890, para. 5. (JURIS-CLASSEUR
PERIODIQUE) (1978).
In the West German system, the investigating prosecutor prefers an official charge if he
finds "sufficient cause." STPO, art. 170, at 497, trans. in J. LANGBEIN, supra note 96, at 160.
The court tribunal then decides in a preliminary hearing whether to convene a full trial of the
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The weight to be assigned to the procuratorial decision at trial is
also related to the division of pretrial functions. 197 In the Chinese sys-
tem the question is whether the procuracy makes its decision to prose-
cute based on the public security organs' recommendation to
prosecute' 98 followed by supplementary investigation by the same pub-
lic security organs, or whether the procuracy carries out a thorough, sep-
arate inquiry of its own.199 A similar question exists in the Soviet
system, since as noted the separation of procurator and investigator is
far from clear.200
The Chinese CP provides for a preliminary hearing of cases sent to
court by the procuracy at which "the court"-by which apparently may
be meant a single judge rather than the entire judicial panel20 '-"con-
siders" the case to determine whether to go forward with a full trial. An
affirmative decision is rendered "where the facts of the crime are clear
and the evidence is complete. ' 20 2 A remand to the procuracy for sup-
plementary investigation may be prescribed if that standard is not met.
If it determines--on unspecified grounds-that "there is no need for a
criminal sentence" the court may demand that the procuracy withdraw
its prosecution.203 Presumably a demand to withdraw the prosecution
could also be prescribed if the standard described above was so far from
being met in the court's mind that remand for further investigation did
case. STPO, arts. 199, 203, at 519-20, trans. in J. LANGBEIN, supra note 96, at 162-63. In
making this decision, the tribunal considers whether there exists "hinreichend verdachtig," or
"sufficient suspicion," against the accused.
197 See text accompanying notes 249-56 infra.
198 CHINESE CP, art. 93.
199 A commentary urges the importance of a full and significant procuratorial considera-
tion and criticizes the "misunderstanding" that the procuracy consideration is unnecessary
after the public security organs have already performed a preliminary investigation. LEC-
TURES, supra note 158, at 85-86.
200 See text accompanying notes 190-91 supra.
201 CHINESE CP, art. 108, says "the court." However, one commentary indicates that a
member of the court is "designated" to study the case, BASIC KNOWLEDGE, supra note 158, at
122, and it would appear that the collegial panel is not formed until after the decision to go to
trial has been rendered by "the court." See CHINESE CP, art. 110, para. 1. On the other
hand, an account of the 1950s criminal procedure system indicates that at that time a desig-
nated judge first studied the case and then was joined by two assessors to decide if trial would
be held. V. CHUGUNOV, CRIMINAL COURT PROCEDURES IN THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUB-
LIC, trans. in JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE (JPRS 4595) 123-24 (1961). A 1955
article stated that the "judge and two people's assessors. . . together constitute a preparatory
examination session." Answering Questions From Readers: On Trial Procedure in Criminal Cases,
Guangming Ribao, Mar. 11, 1955, at 3, trans. in J. COHEN, supra note 49, at 429. Presumably
the collegial panel conducting the preliminary examination also heard the case at the formal
trial.
202 CHINESE CP, art. 108.
203 Id. "When necessary [in the course of its consideration at the preliminary hearing] the




not seem useful. The procurator may, according to a commentary, be
called in during the preliminary hearing to clarify points about the
case.20 4 The defendant does not appear to be expected to appear at this
proceeding. 20 5 Apparently no defense counsel may be present. 20 6
The Soviet system allows the decision on whether to go to trial to be
made by a single judge or, if the judge disagrees with the prosecution on
its conclusion to indict or the case involves crimes of minors or crimes
punishable by death, by an "administrative session" of the collegial
panel of judge and assessors.20 7 A key difference with the Chinese case
lies in the standard to be employed in this decision. In the Chinese CP
the standard is very similar to that employed by the procurator in decid-
ing whether to prosecute and therefore appears close to a determination
of guilt.20 In the Soviet case the decision, whether by the single judge
or the administrative panel, is based on a finding that "sufficient
grounds" exist for hearing the case in court and is made "without prede-
termining the question of guilt. '20 9
An issue of key relevance to the presumption of innocence is pre-
trial detention. The Chinese CP allows a maximum of ten days of "de-
tention. '2 10 After that, either formal "arrest"''2 11 must be approved and
the investigation set in motion, or the suspect must be released. 2 12 How-
ever, an ambiguity is injected by the procuracy's right to require supple-
mentary investigation should it be unable to render its decision, since no
indication is given whether in such a circumstance the detainee must be
released.2 13 In any event, the Chinese CP attempts to restrict arrest to
cases meeting four conditions: the principal facts of the crime have al-
ready been clarified; 2 14 on that basis the person could be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment; allowing the person to remain out of custody
with a guarantor or under surveillance would be insufficient to prevent
204 LECTURES, supra note 158, at 93.
205 Compare CHINESE CP, arts. 108-09.
206 Compare id., art. 110, para. 2.
207 BASIc PRINCIPLES, art. 36, at 137; RussIAN CCP, art. 221, at 242. The prosecutor must
be present at the administrative session. RussIAN CCP, art. 224, at 243. The accused ap-
pears not to be present, though he and/or his defense counsel would seem to have the right to
petition the administrative session and thereby be invited to appear. See RUSSIAN CCP, arts.
46, at 175-76; 51, at 178; 223, 225, at 243-44.
208 See text accompanying notes 193, 196 supra.
209 BASIC PRINCIPLES, art. 36, at 137; RussIAN CCP, arts. 221, at 242; 227, at 244. See
Gorgone, Soviet Criminal Procedure Legislation: A Dissenting Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 577,
591-92 (1980), for a discussion of this point.
210Juliu. CHINESE CP, art. 48. Compare the prior provision of 1954 legislation, note 62
supra.
211 Daibu.
212 CHINESE CP, art. 48.
213 See id., arts. 47, 48.
214 See note 157 & accompanying text supra.
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danger to society; and there is the necessity of arrest.2t 5 A commentary
stresses that all four of these conditions must be met for a decision to
arrest to be made; it interprets the last one as meaning that even if all
three other conditions are met but the decision could still go either way,
arrest should not be used. 216
Generally, a maximum of five-and-one-half months, allowing for
extensions provided, may elapse between the initiation of the investiga-
tion and the decision to prosecute. 21 7 However, an indefinite extension
of the investigation may be granted by the National People's Congress
Standing Committee on application by the Supreme People's Procuracy
"in especially major or complex cases."'218
In the Russian CCP, confinement under guard, the equivalent of
arrest, must be approved within forty-eight hours after detention or the
detainee must be released. 219 Confinement under guard or other meas-
ures of restraint, such as surety, may only continue for ten days in the
absence of a formal "accusation" that sets the investigatory process in
motion. 220 Arrest, as in the Chinese CP, is restricted to cases where the
law provides deprivation of freedom for the crime at issue; other meth-
ods such as various types of sureties seem intended to be considered
before arrest is employed.22' A clear nine-month maximum is provided
in the Soviet system for confinement during pretrial investigation, in-
cluding an "exceptional" extension by the Procurator General that, un-
like in the Chinese case, is limited to three months. 222
215 CHINESE CP, art. 40.
216 LECTURES, supra note 158, at 59.
217 CHINESE CP, arts. 92, 97, 99.
218 Id., art. 92. The relation of these periods to the period of the defendant's confinement is
less than clear. Id., providing a three-month maximum with the special indefinite extension
mentioned in the text for complex cases, is the only article to mention the "period for holding
a defendant in custody." The provisions for a maximum of two-and-one-half months for
procuracy consideration and supplementary investigation, id., arts. 97, 99, simply provide the
time limits for these activities without mentioning the status of the defendant. It seems prob-
able, however, that the intent is for the defendant who is in custody to remain there through-
out the investigatory period. Also unclear are the ramifications for pretrial detention of the
possibility of the remand of a case at the preliminary court hearing stage, after the five-and-
one-half months have presumably elapsed, for further investigation. See text following note
202 supra. Even without such remand, the beginning of the trial is obviously delayed by the
preliminary hearing, on which no time limit is imposed, and the period after presentation of
the indictment. See CHINESE CP, arts. 108-10. The defendant who has been in custody is
apparently expected to remain there during this period. See id. art. 110, para. 2 in conjunction
with art. 29.
219 RUSSIAN CCP, art. 122, at 202-03 (erroneously printed as "eight" hours; error con-
firmed by Prof. H. Berman to author).
220 Id., art 90, at 190.
221 RUSSIAN CCP, arts. 96, at 191-92; 89-95, at 190-91.
222 BASIC PRINCIPLES, art. 34, at 135; RUSSIAN CCP, art. 97, at 192-93. The Russian CCP
does provide indefinite extensions of investigation, but unlike the Chinese CP, see note 218
supra, it clearly distinguishes these extensions of the investigation from the defendant's period
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The ROC Code contains a four-month maximum on detention
during investigation. 223 In the French system, there is no limit to the
"detention provisoire" that may be imposed in serious cases after an ini-
tial maximum of two days of "garde h vue" before the formal accusation
and beginning of investigation.2 24 Such pretrial detention can and does
last several years in some cases. 225
At the trial stage, one of the key issues is the role and position of the
defendant and defense counsel. The defense counsel at trial has under
the Chinese CP the
responsibility... on the basis of the facts and the law, to present materials
and opinions proving that the defendant is not guilty, that his crime is
minor, or that he should receive a mitigated punishment or be exempted
from criminal responsibility, safeguarding the lawful rights and interests of
the defendant. 226
After the questioning of the defendant by the court, both the prosecutor
and the defender may, "with the permission of the presiding judge,"
question the defendant.2 27 The defender or the defendant himself may
request the presiding judge to put questions to witnesses or may request
permission from the presiding judge to put questions directly.228 De-
fendants and defenders also have the right "to apply to notify new wit-
nesses to come to court, to obtain new material evidence, and to apply
for new expert evaluation or inspection. 229 The defendant makes his
statement and defense, and the defender his defense, after the conclusion
of the tribunal's inquiry and the statement of the prosecutor.230 After
the close of debate among the participants in the trial the defendant has
the right to make a final statement.231
The role of defense counsel at trial and the position of the defend-
in custody. Compare RUSSIAN COP, arts. 133, at 208 with art. 97, at 192-93. Compare CHINESE
CP, art. 92. The judge or administrative session conducting the preliminary hearing, see note
207 & accompanying text supra, must either resolve the question of whether the case is to go to
trial within fourteen days, RUSSIAN CCP, art. 221, at 242, or, if the administrative session
decides to refer a case for supplementary investigation, it shall be "obliged to resolve the
question of a measure of restraint with respect to the accused." RUSSIAN CCP, art. 232, at
246. Compare note 218 supra.
223 ROC Code, art. 108, paras. 1, 2, at 361.
224 C. PR. PEN., arts. 63, at 82; 77, at 91. A new law on Iiberth et scurit of 1981, the
implications of which have yet to be fully understood among French jurists, will apparently
increase police power in the area of pretrial detention.
225 Vouin, supira note 196, at 20.
226 CHINESE OP, art. 28.
227 Id., art. 114.
228 Id., art. 115.
229 Id., art. 117. No indication is given of the basis for the decision of the tribunal "on
whether or not to approve the above applications." Id.
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ant are portrayed by the Soviet legislation in a manner basically compa-
rable to that of the Chinese CP.232 Two important provisions, however,
are present in the Russian CCP that are absent from the Chinese CP
and that strengthen the position of the defendant and the defender.
One is the Soviet requirement of defense counsel participation in all
cases involving a state accuser (prosecutoi) or social accuser, which is
presumably a large number of cases.2 33 Counsel's participation is also
obligatory in cases of handicapped or minor defendants, and in other
specified cases. If in these cases the defendant or others on his behalf
have not chosen counsel, either the investigator or the court is obligated
to secure counsel. 234 In the Chinese system, only in the cases of deaf,
mute, or minor defendants must the court designate a defender. In
other cases in which the public prosecutor is participating,2 35 the court
"may designate a defender for a defendant" who has not appointed a
defender.2 36 Also absent from the Chinese CP, though in no way con-
tradicted by it, is the provision in the Russian CCP that the "accuser,
person brought to trial, and defense counsel. . .shall enjoy equal rights
in presenting evidence, participating in the analysis of the evidence, and
submitting petitions. '237
The use of evidence at trial and the standards used in the rendering
of judgment are also relevant to the presumption of innocence. The
Chinese CP calls for the gathering of evidence "that can prove the de-
fendant's guilt or innocence and the gravity of the circumstances of the
crime. '2 38 Following the general statement that "[a]ll facts that prove
the true circumstances of a case are evidence, '239 the Chinese CP lists six
categories of evidence. The Chinese CP, like continental systems gener-
ally, has no restrictive rules of evidence, though it does provide that the
"use of torture to coerce statements and the gathering of evidence by
threat, enticement, deceit or other unlawful means are strictly
prohibited." 240
232 See BASIC PRINCIPLES, art. 23, at 125; RUSSIAN CCP, arts. 51, at 178; 249-50, at 250-51;
278-80, at 260-61; 283, at 261-62; 288-98, at 263-66.
233 The social accuser is a representative of a social organization of working people. RuS-
SIAN CCP, art. 250, at 250-51.
234 RUSSIAN CCP, art. 49, at 177.
235 See CHINESE CP, art. 112. In the first nine months of 1980, a public prosecutor ap-
peared in 96.1% of criminal cases. Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, Jan. 16, 1981, at 1.
236 CHINESE CP, art. 27 (emphasis added).
237 RussIAN CCP, art. 245, at 249.
238 CHINESE CP, art. 32.
239 Id., art. 31. The categories listed are: 1) Material evidence and documentary evidence;
2) Testimony of witnesses; 3) Statements of victims; 4) Statements and explanations of de-
fendants; 5) Conclusions of expert evaluations; 6) Records of inspection and examination.
Id.
240 Id., art. 32. See CHINESE CP, art. 136.
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The general statement that "evidence must undergo examination
for truth before it can be used as the basis for determining cases" 241 is
supported by two specific provisions. The first is the one providing that
"[i]n cases where there is only the testimony of the defendant and there
is no other evidence, the defendant cannot be determined guilty and
sentenced to a criminal punishment. ' 242 A companion provision states
that, where there is no confession but other evidence is "complete and
reliable," guilt may be found.2 43 Together these provisions represent an
important attempt to break away from what Chinese jurists now recog-
nize as the prevalent practice in past years of insisting upon confessions
and placing undue emphasis and reliance on them.24  This second pro-
vision tacitly supports the defendant's right to remain silent 245 and indi-
cates that only other reliable evidence, and not the defendant's silence,
will be sufficient to convict him should he exercise the right.2 46
Another provision for verification of evidence requires that wit-
nesses and their testimony be subjected to in-court questioning and ver-
ification by the prosecutor, and the defendant and defender before such
testimony "may. . .be used as the basis for determining a case."'247
However, another provision seems to undercut the defendant's right to
confront witnesses by providing that records of testimony of witnesses
not present in court are to be read out in court and the "opinions of
parties and defenders. . .heard. ''248
Absent from the Chinese CP is any explicit statement of the princi-
ple, generally accepted in continental jurisdictions, that only evidence
heard or considered at trial may be used as the basis for decision.2 49 The
enunciation of such a principle, which is found in the Russian CCP,250
would serve at least as a theoretical guarantee that testimony, confes-
sions and other evidence gathered at the pretrial stage would not be
accepted by the tribunal without review. The absence of review by the
241 CHINESE CP, art. 31.
242 Id., art. 35.
243 Id.
244 See LECTURES, supra note 158, at 47-48; BASIC KNOWLEDGE, supra note 158, at 75-79;
Chen Yiyun, Emphasize Evidence, Do Not Give Credence Readily to Oral Confessions, Guangming
Ribao, Aug. 17, 1979, at 3. The use of confessions as evidence was a major topic of discussion
in the 1950s. See, e.g., Zhang Zipei, supra note 84. Recall the discussion of the imperial legal
system in section II(A) supra. It is also an issue of concern in other systems. See, e.g., on the
French system, M. ESSAID, supra note 96, § 428.
245 See text accompanying note 188 sup ra.
246 The ROC Code provides this explicitly in the context of a provision similar to the
CHINESE CP, art. 35. ROC Code art. 156, at 373.
247 CHINESE CP, art. 36.
248 Id. art. 116.
249 See A. SHEEHAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN SCOTLAND AND FRANCE 28-29 (1975); Ste-
pan, supra note 39, at 191.
250 RUSSIAN CCP, art. 301, at 267; see also id., art. 295, at 265-66.
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tribunal would cause particular concern if, as may at least sometimes be
the case in the Chinese system, the evidence had not been carefully veri-
fied by at least one body other than the one that gathered it before
forming the basis for the pretrial decision to prosecute the case.25' The
use to be made at trial of the written record of a defendant's statements
or confessions at the pretrial stage is of particular relevance for the pre-
sumption of innocence. A commentary appears to contemplate use of
such records as evidence at trial. 252 These records would presumably be
counted among "other documents serving as evidence" that are to be
read out in court "and the opinions of parties and defend-
ers. . .heard. '253 That the confession would presumably have to be ver-
ified by other evidence offers some protection to the defendant. 254
Nonetheless, the lack of a general, all-encompassing statement of the
direct evidence principle, 255 and of a provision akin to the Russian CCP
stipulation that "no evidence shall have a previously established force
for the court,"256 leave the Chinese CP short of providing a solid
farmework for a fresh, unbiased consideration of a case at the trial level.
The Chinese CP contains neither a direct allocation of the burden
of proof, nor even a "negative" allocation such as the provision in the
Soviet legislation that the burden shall not be shifted onto the ac-
cused. 257 In addition, the Chinese CP gives little indication of the stan-
dard by which the tribunal is to render its decision, providing only that
the collegial panel shall. . .based on the facts and evidence that have been
clarified and on the provisions of the relevant laws, render a judgment as
to whether the defendant is guilty or innocent, what crime he committed,
what criminal punishment is to be applied or whether he should be ex-
251 See text accompanying notes 189-200 supra.
252 LECTURES, supra note 158, at 47.
253 CHINESE CP, art. 116.
254 Id., art. 35.
255 One recent article appears to interpret the Chinese CP as imparting a principle of
direct examination of all evidence at trial. Zhuang Huichen, Disaussion of Open Adudication, 5
FAXUE YANJIU 35, 36 (1980).
256 RuSSIAN CCP, art. 71, at 185.
257 See Code articles cited in note 150 supra. For discussion of the burden of proof question
in Soviet law, see H. BERMAN, supra note 173, at 60-61; Berman, The Presumplion of Innocence:
Another Rep.'y, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 615, 615-23 (1980); Gorgone, supra note 209, at 577-602.
The absence of any provision on the burden of proof in the Chinese CP should probably
not be seen as conclusive of anything. One recent Chinese law review article states the view
that, "in principle," the burden in Chinese criminal procedure is on the prosecution, citing his
reading of the provision of CHINESE CP, art. 35, that confession cannot be the sole basis for
conviction to mean that the prosecutor must gather other evidence. Liao Zhengyun, A Few
Views on the tPrkciple of the Presumption of Innocence, 5 FAXUE YANJIU 32, 33 (1980). European
codes do not necessarily refer to the burden of proof, though the prosecutorial burden is
accepted in those systems. See H. BERMAN, supra note 173, at 60; M. ESSAID, supra note 96,
§§ 163-263. Interestingly, the ROC Code, as revised in 1967, added a provision explicitly
placing the burden of proof on the prosecution. ROC Code, art. 161, at 374.
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empted from criminal punishment.25 8
The Soviet legislation, on the other hand, states explicitly that a judg-
ment of guilty may not be "founded on assumptions and may only be
pronounced if at the hearing of the case the accused has been proved
guilty of committing the crime."2 5 9 The Russian CCP's additional spec-
ification that an acquitting judgment is to be pronounced if that proof
has not been met260 embodies the import of the in dubio pro reo principle.
Complementing these provisions in the Soviet scheme is the requirement
that the court's decision be based on its inner conviction, 26 1 a principle,
absent from the Chinese CP, that one commentary on the Chinese CP
explicitly rejects, 262 but that recent law review commentaries have
supported.2 6 3
Since none of the codes of criminal procedure to which reference
has been made in the foregoing makes specific mention of the presump-
tion of innocence, 264 in order to determine the "presence" of the pre-
sumption in these codes, it is necessary to examine the language of the
codes from the point of view of the presumption and the treatment in
the various codes of the issues raised in the foregoing. None of the conti-
nental-model codes used as bases for comparison with the Chinese CP
emerges with a perfect score after undergoing scrutiny for compatibility
with the presumption of innocence concept. As we have seen, for in-
stance, the Soviet and Republican Chinese legislation limit the full-scale
participation of counsel in the pretrial investigatory activities, taking a
position that cannot be seen as fully consistent with a view that the per-
son being investigated and interrogated is to be presumed innocent.
The guilt standard for prosecution in the Soviet scheme is also a poten-
tial problem although it may be counteracted by the stipulation that the
preliminary court consideration of the case not predetermine the ques-
tion of guilt. Similarly, the failure of French legislation to place any
258 CHINESE CP, art. 120.
259 BASIC PRINCIPLES, art. 43, at 141; RUssIAN CCP, art. 309, at 269.
260 Id. See similarly ROC Code, arts. 299, 301, at 406-07.
261 BASIC PRINCIPLES, art. 17, at 121; RUSSIAN COP, art. 71, at 185.
262 LECTURES, supra note 158, at 55. The same passage rejects the presumption of inno-
cence as being, like the inner conviction principle, "bourgeois," though it makes no attempt
to analyze the Chinese CP from the point of view of the presumption. One of the authors of
the chapter of the LECTURES in which this passage appears is jurist Zhang Zipei (see LEC-
TURES, supra note 158, at Contents page before 1), whose views in opposition to the presump-
tion of innocence have remained essentially unchanged since the 1950s. See notes 1, 20, 102,
103, 104, 105, 106, 112, 114, 122, 123, 124 & accompanying text supra; notes 286, 289, 292 &
accompanying text infa.
263 See, e.g., Wang Jing, On the Assessment of Evidence in Crminal Procedure, 4 FAXUE YANJIU
27, 32-33 (1980). This author suggests that the principle, while bourgeois in origin, can be
imbued with Marxist-Leninist content and used in a socialist legal system. Compare note 96
supra.
264 See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
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time limit on pretrial detention seems to pose a major contradiction
with the notion of the presumption of innocence.
Despite this and other less significant points of doubt, the theoreti-
cal presence of a presumption of innocence in the French and other
Western European codes is rarely if ever disputed. Commentators have
found the ROC Code to embody the presumption of innocence.2 65 Ana-
lysts, both Soviet and foreign, of the Soviet legislation come generally to
a similar conclusion. 266
It would appear significantly more difficult to find the new Chinese
Criminal Procedure Law theoretically consistent with a presumption of
innocence principle, since the Chinese CP seems to contain many more
major discrepancies with the principle than the other codes considered.
The relation of the arrest standard to clarification of the "facts of the
crime," and the standard, apparently close to one of guilt, for prosecu-
tion, are both untempered by any provision comparable to the Soviet
stipulation that the question of guilt must not be predetermined by the
court. The reference to the accused person as the "offender" at the ar-
rest stage also presents problems. Also, the absence of a right to counsel
at pretrial interrogation, and the exclusion of counsel until virtually the
eve of the trial, is a point of concern; as is the failure to afford many
rights to counsel during his pretrial role. The possible indefinite exten-
sion of pretrial detention is relevant, though of relatively minor concern
if limited and controlled as the provision for it indicates it should be.
The failure to provide for the mandatory appointment of defense coun-
sel when a public prosecutor is present at trial is problematic. Finally,
the absence from the Chinese CP of a clear principle of fresh considera-
tion of evidence at trial and of any indication of the burden of proof or
the standard for decision at trial, while not in and of itself necessarily
significant, in light of the other problems with the Chinese CP, serves to
cast further doubt on the basis in the Chinese CP for a presumption of
innocence.
These problems with the Chinese CP, however, by no means end
265 See L. FULLER & H. FISHER, supra note 43, at vii; JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE
ARMY, COUNTRY LAW STUDY FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 80 (1959).
266 See H. BERMAN, supra note 173, at 59; Berman & Quigley, supra note 17, at 1230-31,
1230-31 nn.1-3; Fletchersupra note 191, at 1221; Osakwesupra note 147, at 281, 281-82 n.75;
Strogovich, Adversay Proceedings and Trial Functions in Soviet Criminal Procedure, I SOVIET L. &
Gov'T 11 (1962-63). Seegenerally Gorgone, supra note 209. The chief draftsman of the 1958
Basic Principles has stated that the specific provisions of the Basic Principles, such as the
prohibition on shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, the requirement that the defend-
ant be acquitted if guilt had not been proved, and others discussed supra, have "immeasura-
bly greater significance" toward providing a presumption of innocence than would a general




the discussion on the presumption of innocence in Chinese criminal pro-
cedure. The majority of the difficulties, it should be stressed, stem either
from what could be regarded as imprecise drafting or from failure of the
Chinese CP to include certain concepts or provisions associated with the
presumption in other systems. At no point does the Chinese Criminal
Procedure Law actually negate or preclude the presumption of inno-
cence. For every point mentioned in the foregoing as undermining the
presumption of innocence in the framework of the Chinese CP, counter
arguments may be made that allow for the presumption to exist, albeit
more uneasily and with weaker formal support than in other systems.2 67
Indeed, it was probably the intent of the drafters of the Chinese CP to
produce a piece of legislation ambiguous enough to find support among
both supporters and opponents of the presumption of innocence and re-
lated criminal procedure concepts.268 The continuing debate on the
presumption being carried on in the light of the new Chinese CP dem-
onstrates the drafters' success.
VII. THE CONTINUING DEBATES: 1979-81
The law review discussions of the presumption of innocence and
related points in the period since the release of the Criminal Procedure
Law may be divided into three categories. In the first group are those
that demonstrate a clear understanding of the principle and fully en-
dorse it. In another category are those writers who, partly as a result of
an apparent misconception of the presumption of innocence concept,
purport to reject it out of hand. The analyses of this group tend to fea-
ture a heavy overlay of the political-ideological position of the 1958-60
period 269 which is difficult to separate from their legal arguments. Fi-
nally, an intermediate category of commentators attempts to distinguish
among different interpretations of the presumption and, in the final
analysis, basically accepts it with reservations that seem more formal
than substantive.
The discussions that accept the presumption generally see its pri-
mary import as the concept of in dubio pro reo as applied at all stages of
the criminal process. The principle of "seeking truth from facts," one
267 It may be said that the presumption of innocence exists somewhat uneasily in all sys-
tems. See section VIII(c) infra.
268 The presumption of innocence had its detractors in the Soviet Union at the time of the
drafting of the 1958 Basic Principles. The failure of the Basic Principles to mention the pre-
sumption and their ambiguous statement of some of the principles that embody the presump-
tion, such as the prosecutorial burden of proof, see note 257 & accompanying text supra and
Berman & Quigley, supra note 17, at 1233-34 n.12, may probably be attributed to a desire to
play to both audiences. See Fletcher, supra note 191, at 1221; Gorgone, supra note 209, at 588.
See text accompanying notes 311-13 infra.
269 See section IV supra.
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analyst points out, needs to be supplemented with another principle
when in the absence of clear evidence after investigation a decision must
be made whether an accused is to be released as innocent or held under
suspicion indefinitely. The presumption of innocence, he concludes, is
the proper principle to apply at that point.2 70 In the author's view the
essence of the principle is that the "legal position" of the defendant
should hypothetically be that of an innocent person during the entire
period before the trial judgment.2 7I Another commentator states that to
fall back on the presumption of innocence principle after a fixed period
of investigation has failed to lead to a conclusive result is to adopt a
"materialist" 272 stance on criminal procedure and, thus, is an eminently
suitable approach for a socialist legal system. 2
73
Taking a somewhat different but consistent approach, another dis-
cussion portrays the open trial as the "central link" in the entire crimi-
nal process. Only after a defendant has been judged guilty at trial does
he become a "criminal." The results of the prior links-investigation,
procuracy consideration, preliminary court consideration-are all im-
portant, but only the direct examination of the facts and evidence by
the court should form the basis for a final decision.2 74
This group of commentators finds various sources of support for the
presumption in the Chinese CP.' One writer cites the requirement that
evidence be emphasized and undue reliance not be placed on confes-
sions 275 and the fact that the term "defendant" is used at the pretrial
stage.2 76 Another emphasizes what he sees as the defendant's right to
silence 277 under the Chinese CP, the defendant's lack of responsibility
for false statements,2 78 and his interpretation that under the Chinese CP
a defendant cannot be found guilty as a result of his silence or on the
basis of a bad attitude.2 79
The commentators in the second group who reject the presumption
270 Lan Quanpu, supra note 135, at 16. See also Tian Cai, supra note 131.
271 Lan Quanpu, supra note 135, at 17.
272 See note 116 supra.
273 Wang Xiaohua & Ma Qingguo, Argument on the "Presumption of Innocence," I FAXUE
YANJIU 63, 64 (1980). This article forms part of a four-article feature, Discussion On the Princi-
ple of the 'Presumplion of Innocence," 1 FAXUE YANJIu 62 (1980). A translation of the entire
feature may be found in China Report: Political, Sociological and Military Affairs JOINT
PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE (JPRS 76072), July 18, 1980, at 28-34. The passage re-
ferred to here is trans. in id. at 32.
274 Zhuang Huichen, supra note 255, at 36.
275 Wang Xiaohua & Ma Qingguo, supra note 273, at 64, trans. in JPRS, supra note 273, at
32; CHINESE CP, art. 35.
276 Wang Xiaohua & Ma Qingguo, supra note 273, at 64, trans. in JPRS, supra note 273, at
32; but see text accompanying notes 154-56 supra.
277 Lan Quanpu, supra note 135, at 16 (citing CHINESE CP, arts. 64, 35).
278 Lan Quanpu, supra note 135, at 16 (citing CHINESE CP, arts. 36, 68, 115).
279 Lan Quanpu, supra note 135, at 17. See text accompanying notes 245-46 supra.
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of innocence, seem not to grasp the abstract quality of the presumption,
requiring a suspension of disbelief, that the commentators of the first
group appear to accept. It lacks "logic," one writer argues, to hypothe-
size the innocence of a criminal defendant, since to do so is tantamount
to saying that the public security organs, the procuracy, and the court
are violating the law by arresting, prosecuting, and trying him.280 How,
asks one critic, can the procuracy prosecute or the court try a person
they consider innocent?281 To adopt the principle would ensure that
there could never be any guilty verdicts.2 82
Although they are somewhat less virulent in tone, the recent argu-
ments against the presumption are similar to those of the 1958-60 period
in that they contain both simplistic legal analysis and an overtone of
political dogma that makes it difficult not to attribute their apparent
faulty rendering of the principle to deliberate ideological purposes.2 83
The contemporary authors supporting the presumption concede it to be
specious in contemporary bourgeois countries, but claim that it can be
imbued with proletarian content and applied effectively in the socialist
legal system.284 The current detractors of the principle, on the other
hand, condemn it as inherently "reactionary," "idealistic," and "meta-
physical, '285 and likely to lead the judicial organs to commit "rightist"
mistakes, just as the presumption of guilt caused the Gang of Four to
commit "leftist" mistakes.286 The requirement that an accused be pre-
sumed or considered 287 innocent at all stages of the criminal process
through final judgment, they contend, will have the result of weakening
the power of the proletarian dictatorship in its struggle against crime.2 88
Some of these critics reveal the essentially politico-terminological
nature of their attack by describing what is in essence the presumption
of innocence under the rubric of "seeking truth from facts." Thus, one
consistent critic of the presumption since the 1950s explains that the
entire pretrial process is based on progressive "dialectical" determina-
tions of guilt. If innocence were made clear at any point in the process,
280 Yu Zhi, The Presumption of Innocence Cannot Be A Guiding Thought of Criminal Procedure: A
Discussion With Comrade Lan Quanpu, 3 MINZHU Yu FAZHI 20, 20 (1980).
281 Xiao Hua, The t 'ndzcle of the 'resumption of Innocence" Is Incompatible With Our Countfq
Practice of Criminal Procedure, 1 FAxUE YANJIU 62, 62-63 (1980), trans. in JPRS, supra note 273,
at 29 (emphasis added). See note 105 supra.
282 Xiao Hua, supra note 281, at 63, trans. in JPRS, supra note 273, at 29-30.
283 See note 105; text accompanying note 280 supra.
284 See, e.g., Lan Quanpu, supra note 135, at 15.
285 Tang Guanda, One Should Make a Concrete Analjsis of the "Presumption of Innocence," I
FAX UE YANJIU 64, 64 (1980), trans. in JPRS, sura note 273, at 33.
286 Zhang Zipei, supra note 20, at 31.
287 See note 281 & accompanying text sura.
288 Xiao Hua, supra note 281, at 62, trans. in JPRS, supra note 273, at 29; Zhang Zipei, supra
note 20, at 33.
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of course, the case would be discontinued. If, on the other hand, he
continues, no confirmation (either way) could be reached by the end of
the investigation period, the defendant must be released as innocent-
but this has "nothing to do" with the presumption of innocence.2 89
As might be expected, the writers in this group have no more dif-
ficulty finding provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law to support
their arguments against the presumption of innocence than members of
the first group have finding provisions to bolster theirs. These commen-
tators stress the use of the term "offender" at the arrest stage290 and the
high standards for arrest and prosecution.2 91 This group of commenta-
tors views as embodying the principles of seeking truth from facts and
stress on "investigative research" 292 the provisions of the Chinese CP
limiting detention, forbidding forced confessions, granting right to si-
lence, and related features.
Two of the recent discussions of this question cannot be placed
squarely in either of the two categories described in the foregoing. They
contain elements of the approaches of both of the groups but appear,
when their arguments are subjected to close scrutiny, to be closer to the
first group and, in essence, to support the presumption of innocence.
One author begins by formulating the presumption of innocence as he
sees it expressed in some bourgeois legislation: that the defendant must
be "presumed" or "seen" as293 innocent until the court finds him guilty.
This formulation the writer finds "unscientific" and in contradiction
with the structure of China's criminal procedure.294 This conclusion,
however, does not lead the writer to reject the presumption. Instead, he
proceeds to enunciate what he describes as a "different" formulation of
289 Zhang Zipei, supra note 20, at 31, 32. Recall note 104 & accompanying text supra. See
also Tang Guanda, supra note 285, at 28 [sic], trans. in JPRS, supra note 273, at 34.
290 Yi Xiaozhong, The Pinciple ofthe "Presumption of Innocence" Is Widly Divergent from Our
Country's "Arrest and Detention Act," 1 FAxuE YANJIU 63, 63 (1980), trans. in JPRS, supra note
273, at 31. The author cites Art. 9 of THE ARREST AND DETENTION AcT OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (passed at the Sixth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Fifth
Session of the National People's Congress, Feb. 23, 1979), COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at 89;
trans. in FBIS-CHI, Feb. 26, 1979, at E4, which reads: "Personnel carrying out the task of
arrest or detention may adopt appropriate means of restraint against offenders who resist
arrest or detention and may use weapons when necessary." Most of the Arrest and Detention
Act was incorporated into the CHINESE CP. Article 9 is one provision not so incorporated. It
is unclear whether the Arrest and Detention Act was intended to retain legal force after the
entry into force Jan. 1, 1980, of the Chinese CP.
291 Yi Xiaozhong, supra note 290, at 63, trans. in JPRS, supra note 273, at 30; Xiao Hua,
supra note 281, at 62-63, trans. in JPRS, supra note 273, at 29; Zhang Zipei, supra note 20, at
31. See notes 157, 193 & accompanying text supra.
292 Zhang Zipei, supra note 20, at 33; Zhang Zipei & Tao Mao, supra note 1.
293 Shiwezi Compare note 281 & accompanying text supra.
294 Chen Guangzhang, We Should Critical.' Inherit the Arinciple of the Presumption of Inocence, 4
FAXUE YANJIU 34, 34-35 (1980).
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the principle, that "until the court judgment the defendant is not to be
considered a criminal." This, he concludes, is logical because only the
court has the power to render a judgment; thus, before the court judg-
ment, no one can be considered a "criminal in law," though he may be
and probably is a "criminal in fact. '2
95
At first glance, the author appears to be making a plausible distinc-
tion between what might be termed a "substantive" view of the pre-
sumption of innocence, which he rejects, and a "procedural" view,
which he supports.2 96 On closer consideration, however, the distinction
collapses. The presumption of innocence, after all, really has no "sub-
stantive" aspect. No matter how one chooses to formulate it, the pre-
sumption is an abstract procedural construct that neither purports to
nor generally does bear any relation to reality.2 9 7 The author, in any
event, serves the crowning blow to his attempted distinction by cham-
pioning the in dubio pro reo formulation of the presumption which he
explains as requiring that until the defendant is proved guilty, he be
presumed innocent-the exact concept that he claimed earlier in his ar-
ticle to reject as "unscientific. '298
The other article in this never-never category begins by accepting
the two general propositions that "defendants are not the same as
criminals," and that doubts must be resolved in favor of the defend-
ant.299 Then, in an apparent attempt to make the same distinction as
the article just discussed, this author maintains that the nature and
structure of China's criminal procedure do not allow for defendants to
be "presumed" to be "pure, innocent persons." Application of this "ex-
treme" view of the presumption of innocence would be dangerous to the
295 Id. at 35. Chen finds support for this formulation in the Soviet Union's Basic Princi-
ples, art. 7, see note 146 & accompanying text supra See also CHINESE CP, art. 3; see note 148
& accompanying text supra.
296 A parallel to the different interpretations ofjudicial independence is brought to mind.
There are two different possible interpretations of "judicial independence" in the Chinese
context--one, that the judicial system should be substantively, ie., ideologically, independent
of the Party and of all extralegal influences, the other, that the courts, like all institutions, are
subject to the Party's ideological guidance but that, procedurally, they decide their own cases
on a day-to-day basis without direct Party involvement.
It is of course the latter view that the Chinese leadership has always had in mind when
speaking of judicial independence. For recent discussions, see, e.g., Liu Guangming, The Peo-
ple Courts Adjudicate Independentd y and Oby Ony the Law, 3 FAXUE YANJIU 29 (1979); PengZhen, A Few Questions Regarding the Socialist Legal System, 11 HONGGI (RED F.AG) 3,6-7 (1979);
Qiao Wei, Adidicate Independenty, Obq On4' the Law, Renmin Ribao, Jan. 5, 1979, at 3.
297 See section VIII(c) in/a. The author of the article under discussion, indeed, indicates
his awareness of this point. See Chen Guangzhang, supra note 294, at 36: "The legal pre-
sumption. . . does not necessarily comport with reality. .. "
298 To his credit, or discredit, Chen tries to save face by assuring us a few lines down that
this view of the principle does not require that the defendant be presumed innocent, but just
that he be found to be innocent if his guilt cannot be proved. Id. at 35; see also id. at 36.
299 Liao Zhengyun, sura note 257, at 32.
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fight against crime, giving criminals an escape hatch.300 It is this "abso-
lutist" formulation that leads to the position, which the author apparen-
tly finds both mistaken and not mandated by the Criminal Procedure
Law, that the defendant has the right to refuse to speak and even the
right to make false statements. To carry the presumption this far is to
impede the criminal process and to be "one-sided" in favor of defend-
ants.3° 1 The writer does not attempt to explain how one particular for-
mulation of the presumption necessarily carries these undesirable
implications while the others he advocates do not.
As a postscript to this review of the recent literature on the pre-
sumption of innocence, it should be noted that current discussions of the
position of defendant and the role of criminal defense lawyers recall
those of the 1956-57 period30 2 and are basically consistent with a pre-
sumption of innocence approach. Since the actual "criminal" status of a
defendant cannot be finally decided until the court judgment, the con-
temporary commentaries on this subject agree, the defendant's exercise
of his right to defense and the defense lawyer's efforts on his behalf
should not be regarded, as some judicial officials continue to regard
them, as "crafty," "resisting" behavior designed to cover up criminal
responsibility. 30 3 The defendant is portrayed as a "party" in court, en-
joying citizen's rights until such time as his guilt is proclaimed by the
court judgment. 30 4 The defense lawyer, while not the defendant's
"agent" and having no right to make false arguments on the defendant's
behalf, has the right and the duty to counter incorrect factual and legal
arguments of the prosecution by making points tending to demonstrate
the defendant's innocence or by arguing mitigating circumstances. 30 5
As might be expected from their general approach, the current analysts
take the position that a defense lawyer, who must have the defendant's
trust, need not and should not reveal crimes of the defendant unknown
to the court, though he should make every attempt to persuade the de-
fendant to confess them. 30 6
300 Id. at 33.
301 Id. at 33-34.
302 See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra.
303 Cheng Rongbin, The Defendant In CrminalProcedure, 2 MINZHU Yu FAZHI 21, 22 (1980).
See a/so SUN YINGJIE & FENG CAIJIN, BASIC KNOWLEDGE ABOUT LAWYERS 46-48 (1980);
Liao Junchang, & Xu Jingcun, Brief Discssion of Our Counti,'s Defense Sstem, I XINAN
ZHENGFA XUEYUAN XUEBAO (JOURNAL OF THE SOUTHWEST POLITICAL-LEGAL INSTITUTE)
16, 18-19 (1980).
304 Cheng Rongbin, supra note 303, at 22.
305 Liao Junchang & Xu Jingcun, sufra note 303, at 18-19; see also BASIC KNOWLEDGE,
supra note 158, at 58.




VIII. THE PROBLEMS FOR THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN
CHINA: COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS
The continuing discussions of the presumption of innocence in the
Chinese legal literature and the interest the Chinese are showing in
learning about foreign experience with the doctrine 30 7 indicate that the
issue is of more than passing concern as China molds its legal system.
Both the divergence of views in the contemporary law reviews and the
prior history of debates on the issue suggest that the presumption of
innocence is an issue that causes many difficulties and tensions for the
Chinese. These difficulties and tensions have historical, ideological, con-
ceptual, and practical aspects. In some respects they reflect peculiarly
Chinese circumstances, but to a great extent they are faced in one form
or another by other legal systems.
A. HISTORICAL
The People's Republic is not unique in bearing the burden of a
traditional legal system that was often cruelly inquisitorial and generally
unconcerned with the procedural rights of the accused. In China, how-
ever, the nature of this system was in many respects the outcome of a
deep-rooted and long-standing philosophy, revolving around the all-im-
portant concept of social harmony, a harmony that was felt to be dis-
turbed by anyone who became involved in any way with the law.30 8
This philosophy, engrained in officialdom as in the people at large, was
difficult to displace by the importation of Western European legal con-
cepts that began to occur in the late nineteenth century. These concepts
had a history of barely fifty years in China before the Communist Party
took power. This period was not characterized by the political stability
and unity that might have been conducive to the gradual absorption of
new legal ideas through a combination of doctrinal development and
practical experience. The Communists took control of a China that was
in many ways sociologically and philosophically unchanged from the
imperial era, despite the Western-influenced structures and concepts
that had found their way into its political and legal orders.
B. IDEOLOGICAL
Furthermore, in addition to wanting to break with the imperial,
307 One of the Chinese journals featuring translations of foreign legal materials recently
published the analysis of a Japanese scholar of the presumption of innocence in Soviet law.
Ueno, The Th'ncible of the 'resumption of Innocence" in Soviet Law, 1 GUOWAI FAXUE (FOREIGN
LEGAL SCIENCE) 58 (1980). Foreign lawyers and law teachers in China are frequently asked
about this subject.
308 See section II(A) supra; see D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 36, at 1-51.
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"feudal" past, the Chinese Communists in 1949 were also intent on up-
rooting Western, "bourgeois" legal ideas to the extent they had begun to
develop in China during the Nationalist Republic. Indeed, one of the
first acts of the new people's government was to annul the entire set of
Nationalist Chinese laws 30 9 and proceed to undertake a sweeping "judi-
cial reform." 3 10 Little attempt seems to have been made at this early
stage to analyze principles such as the presumption of innocence or to
evaluate their usefulness for China; the driving goal was simply to ex-
punge all associations with the old Chinese order and the Western world
and inaugurate a new socialist China with a clean slate. By the mid-
1950s, the leadership had become willing to entertain the idea that legal
concepts and methods that had their antecedents in a different political
and class setting from new China's could be selectively inherited and
made to serve the Chinese system. The foreign concepts, however, were
easy and obvious targets when the regime saw its hold over the hearts
and minds of certain sectors of the society becoming less firm than it
required. Again in large part without substantive analysis of the ideas
under attack, the Party line beginning in mid-1957 branded the pre-
sumption of innocence and related principles as incurably foreign and
"bourgeois," and entirely unsuitable for socialist China.
The Soviet Union never attempted such a clean sweep of prior law
and legal ideas after the Bolshevik Revolution as the Chinese Commu-
nists did in 1949 and thereafter. Nonetheless, ideological underpinnings
have not been absent from the Soviet experience with the presumption
of innocence. During the debates on the issue in the decade preceding
the adoption of the 1958 Basic Principles of Criminal Procedure, al-
though the literature was apparently largely supportive of the presump-
tion,3 11 there were those jurists who "preached an end" to the doctrine,
"declaring it a bourgeois survival. '3 12 Opinion on the question was evi-
dently divided at the session of the Supreme Soviet that passed the Basic
Principles, and the failure explicitly to mention the presumption of in-
nocence in that document may have been a concession to those with the
view of one deputy that the presumption was "a worm-eaten dogma of
bourgeois doctrine."3 13 Even since the mid-1960s, when the presump-
tion of innocence was included as "one of the important democratic
309 COMMON PROGRAM OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONGRESS
(passed at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress,
Sept. 29, 1949), art. 17, i FLHB (1949-1950) 19, trans. in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS,
supra note 57, at 41.
310 See section II(D) supra.
311 See Fletcher, supra note 191, at 1205.
312 Rakhunov, Soviet Justice and Its Role In Strengthening Legality, trans, in CDSP, Nov. 14,
1956, at 6, 7.
313 Fletcher, supra note 191, at 1205.
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principles of Soviet criminal procedures" in a legal encyclopedia, 31 4 the
doctrine apparently has continued to be subject to the criticism that it is
"bourgeois" and unsuitable for the Soviet system.315 It is thus not sur-
prising that socialist China, whose political and ideological history has
been much shorter and in many .respects more tumultuous than that of
the Soviet Union, should still be in the throes of debate on the "inherita-
bility" of legal concepts3 16 and that the view that new China should
formulate its own legal doctrines, and dispense with all the trappings of
the order it overthrew, should continue to enjoy support.
C. CONCEPTUAL
Above and beyond the unique historical and ideological difficulties
China faces with the presumption of innocence is the problem, shared
by all legal systems which employ the presumption, of coming to terms
with what is in many ways a "conceptually anomalous" 31 7 doctrine, a
concept that appears quite meaningless on all but a highly abstract
level. 318 As Chinese jurists have shown themselves to understand, the
proposition that the trial judge in a continental system of criminal pro-
cedure is to presume the defendant innocent is difficult to reconcile with
the nature of the system. It seems obvious that a Chinese court receiving
a case after a thorough, two-stage pretrial investigation followed by a
procuratorial determination, for all intents and purposes of guilt, in turn
followed by a preliminary court screening of the case, will be hard
pressed to ignore all that has gone before and start from ground zero,
presuming the defendant innocent. Though they may to some extent be
the result of self-fulfilling prophecy, China's conviction statistics31 9 con-
tribute to demonstrating the air of unreality involved in saying that the
314 Berman & Quigley, supra note 17, at 1230, 1230 n.1. See similarly Baliev & Savitskii,
Legality andJustice, trans. in THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 119 (J. Hazard, W. Butler & P.
Maggs eds. 1977 ed.). (The presumption of innocence is among "the most important demo-
cratic principles of Soviet criminal procedure.").
315 Petrukhin, supra note 147, at 14.
316 See notes 143-44 & accompanying text supra.
317 Fletcher, supra note 191, at 1203.
318 See genera l'y J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 197-98 (1975); Packer, Two Models
of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9-13 (1964).
319 In 1979, 95.8% of cases tried in the courts ended in a guilty judgment; 3.6% ended in
exemption from criminal punishment for various mitigating circumstances; 0.6% ended in
judgments of innocence. Work Report of Huang Huoqing, Chief Procurator of the Supreme Peoples
Procuraq, to the 141h Meeting of the Standing Committee of the FPJ/h Session of the National Peoples
Congress, April 11, 1980, Renmin Ribao, Apr. 12, 1980, at 1, 4. In the first half of 1980, the
cases ending in guilty judgments amounted to over 97% of cases heard. Work Report of Huang
Huoqing to the 15th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Fijh Session of the National Peoples
Congress, Sept. 2, 1980, Renmin Ribao, Sept. 17, 1980, at 2. In Beijing, 0.15% of cases
presented to the courts in the first nine months of 1980 ended in judgments of innocence. 3
FAXUE ZAzHI (JOURNAL OF LEGAL SCIENCE) 22 (1980).
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defendant is to be presumed innocent by the time he has reached the
trial stage.3 2
0
If it is at the pretrial stage that in most cases guilt is effectively
determined in the Chinese system, then it would appear to be at that
stage that the presumption should have its real operational significance.
If the Chinese procurator and his counterparts in other systems are in
essence acting as judges of first instance, with the function of the court
tribunal being primarily to perform a review of their findings, 32 1 then,
to ensure a fair process, these officials should adopt the presumption of
innocence as they go about their task.322 Yet, though they may be de
facto judges, these pretrial officials are de jure prosecutors, and prosecu-
tors tend to take a prosecutorial point of view. The argument of Chi-
nese detractors of the presumption of innocence that it is unreasonable
to expect procuratorial officials to "consider" defendants innocent in the
course of their work may be a deliberate attempt at confusion for polit-
ical ends,323 but it nonetheless contains the essence of a real contradic-
tion that supporters of the presumption of innocence cannot fail to
perceive as well. One might well ask why-if the presumption of inno-
cence is to prevail at the pretrial stage-is the defendant in China de-
prived of the right to counsel at this stage? The answer, accepted by
Chinese jurists who claim to support the presumption of innocence at all
stages of the process, is that such a right would impede too much the
principal goal of the pretrial activities, which is to ferret out crime.3 24
It is obviously true that if pretrial officials had to adopt procedural
guarantees that are consistent with a presumption of innocence, includ-
ing giving the defendant a full-scale right to defense, they would be un-
able to fulfill their investigatory role with maximum efficiency. Thus,
they carry out that role in the absence of at least some of those guaran-
tees. If pretrial officials arrive at a determination that the case should go
to court, the presumption of innocence disappears forever for, as has
320 Also relevant in this regard is the role of the Chinese defense lawyer at trial. In few
reported cases does counsel argue his client's innocence; indeed, in many cases he or she be-
gins by acknowledging the defendant's guilt and proceeds to argue mitigating circumstances
or, in some cases, disputes certain of the charges and argues for a different provision of the
Criminal Code to be applied than the one the prosecutor has chosen. See Gelatt, Resurrecting
Chza's Legal Institutions, Asian W. St. J., Mar. 29, 1980, at 4, col. 1. Again, there may be an
element of the self-fulfilling prophecy operating in this connection. See text accompanying
note 319 supra.
321 Some Soviet jurists have portrayed the Soviet system in this manner. See Fletcher, supra
note 191, at 1218-19. Recall text accompanying note 102 supra.
322 Proponents of the presumption of innocence in the Soviet Union agree that the pre-
sumption should apply at the pretrial stage. Fletcher, supra note 191, at 1217.
323 See note 283 & accompanying text supra.
324 Set section III supra, especially text accompanying notes 65-71 supra.
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been pointed out, the court is unlikely to discount the conclusion result-
ing from exhaustive pretrial activity and presume innocence at trial.
The valiant attempts of Chinese jurists who support the concept of
the presumption of innocence to deal with the difficulties it poses, by, for
instance, distinguishing the presumption of innocence from the "non-
consideration of guilt," 325 are not unique to China. Soviet jurists have
confronted the problem, which may be compounded by a phenomenon
of the Russian language that apparently causes "presume" to be trans-
lated "consider," 326 and have devised similar "solutions." One analyst
explains that the accused at the preliminary stage is not "considered
innocent," but only "not considered guilty;" 32 7 another claims that
while neither the prosecutor nor the court may be expected to presume
the defendant innocent, "the law" presumes him innocent.3 28
These conceptual tensions and contradictions may come to the sur-
face more in the socialist countries because the ideological ramifications
of the presumption prompt its discussion and debate. In countries such
as France, where in a sense the presumption was born,329 one sees little if
any challenge to the proposition that the presumption can and does ex-
ist. Yet, essentially the same problems face the French system; in fact,
that system is the model that creates many of the problems. While the
French make some concession to the pretrial presumption of innocence
by allowing a certain right to counsel at the instruction phase, 330 that
phase remains highly prosecutorial in nature and its outcome is likely to
be given considerable weight without a full-fledged de novo considera-
tion by the trial court.331
Continental legal systems are not alone in facing conceptual diffi-
culties with the presumption of innocence. In the Anglo-American legal
system, the low probable cause standard for prosecution and the absence
of the extensive pretrial procedure found in the continental pattern
might make the presumption of innocence at trial seem at least theoreti-
cally easier to accept than in the continental model.3 32 One would
hardly expect, however, that, while being recognized and accepted for
325 See text accompanying notes 293-95 supra.
326 See H. BERMAN, supra note 173, at 62. See note 105 supra.
327 Polyansky, The Question of the Presumption of Innocence in Soviet Law, CDSP, Apr. 8, 1950,
at 11, 12.
328 M. Strogovich, quoted in Fletcher, sura note 191, at 1220.
329 See text accompanying note 40 supra.
330 See note 176 supra.
331 See generally Vouin, supra note 196; Vouin, The Protection of the Accused in French .Criminal
Procedure Part II, 5 INT. & COMP. LAW Q. 157, 158 (1956).
332 In fact, the conceptual difficulties with the presumption of innocence at trial are proba-
bly not significantly less in the Anglo-American system than in the continental molel. How-
ever, it may be that the Anglo-American "due process model" has a greater stake in denying
the difficulties and upholding the "fiction" of the presumption than does the continental
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the trial stage, the presumption of innocence could be declared to have
"no application" at the pretrial stage. That, nonetheless, is what the
United States Supreme Court recently stated, 333 in rejecting the analysis
of a line of circuit court cases whose holdings for pretrial detainees com-
plaining of poor conditions and treatment had been based on a pre-
sumption of innocence analysis.3 34 Whereas the District of Columbia
circuit had stated that the "liberty interest of the pretrial detainees is
rooted in the presumption of innocence, ' 335 the Supreme Court main-
tained that the presumption was exclusively a rule for the allocation of
the burden of proof at trial. 336 This proposition seems to stem from an
attempt to escape from conceptual confusion, an attempt not far in its
metaphysical quality from the methods employed by Chinese and So-
viet jurists. The "presumption of innocence" is seen to be somewhat in
conflict with various pretrial activities such as detention.33 7 Thus, the
presumption is said not to exist at the pretrial stage; rather, there is only
a fourteenth amendment right not to befpunished prior to the adjudica-
tion of guilt in accordance with due process of law.
338
D. PRACTICAL
Finally, the various problems with the presumption of innocence in
China discussed thus far are difficult to separate from various realities of
the Chinese system that may pose serious contradictions with the pre-
sumption. Insofar as certain aspects of the Criminal Procedure Law ap-
pear to be conceptually compatible with the presumption of innocence,
it must be asked whether they are being followed. Are, for instance, the
time limits, which in most cases require the procuracy to end the investi-
gation and release the detained defendant after a certain period if it
cannot meet its standard for prosecution, being observed? This aspect of
"crime control" model. See Packer, supra note 318, at 12-13; see also J. SKOLNICK, supra note
318, at 182-83, 197-98.
333 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).
334 Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974); Detainees of the Brooklyn House
of Detention For Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975). These cases adopted the
view that, since pretrial detainees enjoyed the presumption of innocence, restrictions on their
rights must be justified by a "compelling necessity," a formulation similar to that in the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, see note 16 supra.
335 Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
336 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 533.
337 See Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1080 n.1 (3d Cir. 1975),
citedin Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 532.
338 441 U.S. at 533. In 1951, the Supreme Court had specifically equated the "presump-
tion of innocence" with the right not to be "punished" before trial and the right to be granted
bail. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). For a more recent example of Supreme Court
dictum accepting the presumption of innocence at the pretrial stage, see McGinnis v. Royster,
410 U.S. 263, 273 (1973).
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the Chinese CP has proved among the most difficult to implement; a
shortage of investigatory officials was cited as necessitating legislation to
extend those time limits during 1980 beyond those provided in the Chi-
nese CP.339 It is impossible at this point to tell the extent to which the
Chinese CP limits are now being applied, as they should be, but a high
success rate would be surprising at this early stage. Also difficult to
quantify is the extent to which pretrial detention is being employed as
circumspectly as the law would seem to require340 and whether, once in
detention, pretrial defendants are being subjected to poor conditions, ill-
fed, forced to labor, and shaved bald, all of which have been known to
occur in China in the pastA4'
More fundamental is the extent to which the criminal process, with
the protections it theoretically provides, is being bypassed for such "non-
criminal," "administrative" methods as "rehabilitation through labor."
The latter sanction, which involves a stay in a labor camp, is to be
meted out ex parte by a committee of public security, civil affairs, and
labor officials for, among others, "those who do not engage in proper
employment, those who behave like hoodlums and those who engage in
theft, swindling or other such conduct but whose criminal responsibility
339 See note 218 & accompanying text supra. A decision of the National People's Congress
Standing Committee in February 1980, provided that: "If there are too many cases, and
personnel handling cases is insufficient and [thus] unable to handle cases according to the
time limits prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Law regarding the investigation [and] pros-
ecution phases. . . within the year 1980, the standing committees of [provincial-level] peo-
ple's congresses may approve extensions of the time limits for handling cases." Decision of the
(13th Meeting of the) Standing Committee of the Fifth Session of the National People's Con-
gress Regarding Questions of Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law (Feb. 12,
1980), Renmin Ribao, Feb. 13, 1980, at 1, trans. in FBIS-CHI, Feb. 13, 1980, at L6. Such
extensions were approved in various parts of China; in Peking, for instance, the maximum
pretrial detention time seemed to have been extended to seven months. Decision of the 3d
Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 7th Session of the (Peking) City People's Congress
Regarding the Extension of Time Limits for Handling Criminal Cases (Apr. 1, 1980), Beijing
Ribao (Peking Daily), Apr. 2, 1980, at I.
A decision passed September 10, 1981, by the 20th Meeting of the Standing Committee
of the 5th Session of the National People's Congress provides that "in general" cases received
by the investigatory authorities on or after January 1, 1981, should be handled in accordance
with the time limits in the Chinese CP. However, if in "a small number of criminal cases
where the circumstances of the case are complex or which take place in outlying districts to
which transportation is inconvenient," the time limits in Articles 92, 97, 125 and 142 of the
Chinese CP cannot be observed, the Decision authorizes the standing committees of the pro-
vincial-level people's congresses, from 1981 to 1983, to "decide or approve appropriate exten-
sions of the time periods for handling cases." Decision of the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress Regarding the Question of Time Limits for Handling Cases
(Sept. 10, 1981), Renmin Ribao, Sept. 11, 1981, at 1; trans. in FBIS-CHI, Sept. 15, 1981, at
KS.
340 See text accompanying notes 214-16 supra.
341 See generaly BAO R'uo-WANG (J. PASQUAMNI) & R. CHELMINSKI, suMpra note 141; A. &
A. RIcK=r, supra note 90.
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is not pursued. '342 Although the Chinese have passed measures limiting
the period of rehabilitation through labor to a maximum of four years343
and curbing the use of a variety of other administrative methods such as
"forced labor" and "taking in for investigation," 344 the fact remains that
up to four years of treatment that apparently is not appreciably differ-
ent from that accorded real "criminals" may be prescribed without any
clear standard for when this non-criminal method is to be employed
instead of the criminal process. When it is employed, there is not even
any pretense that the accused is to be treated as potentially innocent.
In addition, it is not possible to assess the practical prospects for the
presumption of innocence in the Chinese system without considering the
role of the Communist Party. By the admission of the Chinese them-
selves, the Party committees in judicial organs have in the past had their
own sets of regulations, superseding other laws, allowing them, for in-
stance, to extend detention periods indefinitely when they consider it
necessary. 345 It has been the network of Party committees, and not the
judicial system, that has effectively been the principal force in handling
and deciding cases. The Chinese are engaged in what is clearly a good
faith effort to change those practices, 346 but to the extent they remain,
342 DECISION OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA RELATING
TO PROBLEMS OF REHABILITATION THROUGH LABOR, (approved at the 78th Meeting of the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Aug. 1, 1957, promulgated by the
State Council, Aug. 3, 1957), art. 1 6 FGHB 243 (July-Dec. 1957)), tram. in J. COHEN, supra
note 49, at 249.
343 SUPPLEMENTARY REGULATIONS OF THE STATE COUNCIL ON REHABILITATION
THROUGH LABOR, art. 3 (approved at the 12th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the
Fifth Session of the National People's Congress, Nov. 29, 1979, promulgated by the State
Council, Nov. 29, 1979), art. 3; Renmin Ribao, Feb. 26, 1980, at 4; trans, in FBIS-CHI, Feb.
26, 1980, at L5.
344 Notice of the State Council on Consolidating the Measures of Forced Labor and Tak-
ing In For Investigation With Rehabilitation Through Labor, Feb. 29, 1980, Zhonghua
Renmin Goncheguo Guowuyuan Gongbao (People's Republic of China State Council Ga-
zette), Apr. 16, 1980, at 57. One of the dissident journals in China described the "reception
centers" used for people not convicted of crimes but given various administrative sanctions.
People who are received [in these places] are nominally different from citizens who have
been convicted of various crimes and detained. However, their treatment is worse than
that of the convicts because they have 1) no definite discharge date, 2) no personal free-
dom and 3) no freedom to be visited by their dependents and no freedom of communica-
tion. They lead an inhuman life. [People have been detained in these places] for 10
years. . .5 years and. . .3, 2, or 1 years.
Liang Yao, The "Deeds and Virtues" of Virtue Forest, 3 TANSUO (EXPLORATION) 11 (1979), trans.
in Translations on the People's Republic of China: JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERV-
ICE (JPRS 73421), May 10, 1979, at 37.
345 Conversation of author with judge in China (May 1980),
346 See Chief/jUtice of the Supreme people's Court Jiang Hua Calls For the Guarantee of Courts'
Independent Adjudication and the Abolition of the Practice of Party Committees' Reviewing and Approving
Cases, Renmin Ribao, Aug. 25, 1980, at 1, trans. in FBIS-CHI, Aug. 27, 1980 at L7.
[Vol. 73
CHINESE CODE SYMPOSIUM
they may vitiate the protections that the legal system purports to
provide.
In this practical realm, as in others, the Chinese are not alone in the
problems they face. For instance, both Soviet and Nationalist Chinese
jurists have recognized the contradictions posed by the existence in their
systems of procedures outside the formal criminal process to punish peo-
ple without the guarantees of that process.347 An American analyst has
examined the circumstances in which police in our society treat minor
offenses such as traffic violations in a way that creates a clear presump-
tion of guilt for the defendant to rebut.348
The American system, in fact, has one of the poorest records on the
actual practice of the presumption of innocence. Pretrial detention is
often lengthy and conditions are so difficult that punishment for those
convicted at trial may well be "less severe than the pretrial detention
they suffered when they were theoretically 'presumed innocent.' ,,349 In
any event, most of those detainees will never go to the trial where their
innocence is presumed, for in the United States, in the words of a re-
nowned criminal defense lawyer, "[t]rials are obsolete [and] [t]he gov-
ernment no longer has the money to afford the luxury of presuming
innocence. '35 0 Instead, the vast majority of defendants plead guilty and
plea bargain to obtain a lenient sentence, often pressured by the clear
implication that if they choose to go to trial, and are found guilty by the
jury, the sentence could be more severe. In such a system, it might be
said, "[t]he guilty always win[;] [t]he innocent always lose."'3 5 1
IX. CONCLUSION
In light of the many different types of problems, historical, ideologi-
cal, conceptual, and practical, posed for China by the presumption of
innocence, the struggles with the subject in the 1950s and again before
and after the release of the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law are hardly
surprising. They seem even less surprising when one recalls the similar
difficulties confronted by legal systems that have had much more time
to grapple with these issues than the still fledgling system of new China.
It would be unrealistic to expect the Chinese to have come to terms by
this point with an issue as full of complex implications as the p'resump-
tion of innocence. The various statements in support of and in opposi-
347 Petrukhin,supra note 147, at 15; Tao, Reform of/he Criminal Process In Nationalist China, 19
AM. J. COMP. L. 747, 756 (1971).
348 J. SKOLNICK, sufira note 318, at 75, 91.
349 Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79 YALE L. J. 941, 947
(1970).
350 Erdmann, I Have Nothing To Do WithJustice, LIFE, Mar. 12, 1971, at 56.
351 See generalo' L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 71-86 (1977).
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tion to the presumption that will continue to emanate from China will
have to be studied and evaluated in light of the previous discussions, the
evolving legal framework and practice, and the political situation. For-
eign observers would do well to be wary of forming early conclusions on
the presumption of innocence in China, for the last word on the subject
is far from being spoken.
